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THE PLIGHT OF THE SECULAR PARADIGM
Steven D. Smith*
Ever since the Peace of Westphalia, or in any case since the
Enlightenment, or possibly from the enactment of the American Constitution, or at least since the early twentieth century, or most definitely over the last couple of decades or so, it has been accepted in
western nations and their progeny, among dominant minorities anyway (to borrow a term1), that governments and the laws they impose
must be “secular” (whatever that means).2 This requirement of governmental secularity has been argued for, or at least asserted, or in
any case assumed, in law3 and in political theorizing.4 “[T]here is a
broad consensus,” Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor approvingly
report, “that ‘secularism’ is an essential component of any liberal
democracy composed of citizens who adhere to a plurality of conceptions of the world and of the good . . . .”5
 2013 Steven D. Smith. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I thank
Larry Alexander, Bob Cochran, Ed Larson, Maimon Schwarzschild, and Brian
Tamanaha for helpful comments on an earlier draft. In addition, I presented earlier
versions in a workshop at Vanderbilt and a conference at Pepperdine: questions and
objections posed in these discussions were helpful as well.
1 See infra note 51 and accompanying text.
2 For an illuminating discussion of the historically shifting meanings of the
term“secular,” see Nomi Stolzenberg, The Profanity of Law, in LAW AND THE SACRED 29,
35 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2007). For essays considering the varieties of meanings
that the term carries globally today, see RETHINKING SECULARISM (Craig Calhoun et al.
eds., 2011).
3 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (declaring that laws
must have secular purposes and primarily secular effects).
4 See, e.g., ROBERT AUDI, RELIGIOUS COMMITMENT AND SECULAR REASON (2000)
(discussing necessity of secular government in free societies); see also infra note 19 and
accompanying text (discussing secular sources of government legitimacy).
5 JOCELYN MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE 2 (Jane Marie Todd trans., 2011).
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The requirement of secular government has been central to what
I will call the prevailing “paradigm of legitimacy.” Governments or
laws that transgress the requirement by straying beyond the secular
and lapsing into “religion” (whatever that is6) thereby imperil their
legitimacy and compromise their claim on their subjects’ respect and
obedience. Or at least so it has been widely supposed.
The secular paradigm as a basis of political and legal legitimacy
was not always in place,7 however, and it is not foreordained that the
paradigm always will be in place. On the contrary, there are indications that the paradigm is already losing its grip—that it may even be
in a condition of crisis, or breakdown. Thus, Rajeev Bhargava argues
for a rehabilitation of secularism precisely because, as he observes,
“[o]nly someone with blinkered vision would deny the crisis of
secularism.”8
This Essay explores this perceived crisis. Part I discusses the
nature of a “paradigm of legitimacy.” Part II outlines the strategies of
assimilation and marginalization that historically have supported such
paradigms and, borrowing from the work of Thomas Kuhn and
Arnold Toynbee, considers the paradigm shifts that can occur when
these strategies prove ineffective. Part III illustrates these observations
by reviewing the process by which, beginning in the fourth century, a
Christian paradigm replaced an earlier Roman one and then in turn
was displaced by a more secular view. These first three Parts are a
prelude to Part IV, the longest in the essay, which discusses the rise of
the secular paradigm, the strategies that have supported it, the
increasing futility of those strategies, and the consequent present distress. As part of that discussion Part IV considers a potentially crucial
distinction—between a secular paradigm of legitimacy and a paradigm of
secular legitimacy—that is usually overlooked in contemporary discussions. The conclusion briefly reflects on the prospects.

6

See José Casanova, The Secular, Secularizations, Secularisms, in RETHINKING SECUsupra note 2, at 54, 62 (“It is obvious that when people around the world use
the same category of religion, they actually mean very different things.”). For an argument that “religion” does not denote a category that is useful in law, see Steven D.
Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church?, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS
PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES (Austin Sarat ed., 2012).
7 Cf. MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 17 (asserting that the secularist conception that they advocate, and that they perceive to enjoy a global consensus in liberal democratic societies, “has appeared only recently in history”).
8 Rajeev Bhargava, Rehabilitating Secularism, in RETHINKING SECULARISM, supra
note 2, at 92, 93.
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LEGITIMACY

Governments claim legitimacy. Not everyone will be persuaded
by such claims, of course, or even by the proposed distinction between
“legitimate” and “illegitimate” rule. Augustine recounted the story of
a pirate captured by Alexander the Great. Asked by Alexander what
he meant by marauding on the seas, the pirate answered, “What you
mean by warring on the whole world. I do my fighting on a tiny ship,
and they call me a pirate; you do yours with a large fleet, and they call
you Commander.”9
The story is provocative precisely because it challenges a distinction that is familiar, and a claim that governments make, probably of
necessity. Governments claim that there is such a thing as “legitimacy,” that they possess it, and that in this respect they are different
from other wielders of power (such as pirates, or gangsters).
Legal theorists make a similar point with respect to law. Law
claims “authority,” which can be another name for, or alter ego, or at
least close sibling of, legitimacy.10 There is a crucial difference,
H.L.A. Hart famously maintained, between the mugger who demands
your wallet and the tax collector who demands your payment; unlike
the mugger, as an agent of the (presumptively legitimate) government
the tax collector claims authority and imposes, or purports to impose,
obligation.11 Once again, the distinction can be doubted: Holmes’s
celebrated “bad man,” who recognizes no obligation and cares only
about the consequences of compliance or non-compliance,12 regards
law in the way Augustine’s pirate regarded government. But legal
regimes assert that the bad man is missing a crucial distinction; they
claim (of necessity, according to Joseph Raz13) that there is such a
thing as authority and that their law has it, and that there is such a
thing as obligation and that their law imposes it.
9 AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD, bk. IV, ch. 4 (Gerald G. Walsh, S.J., et al. trans.,
1950).
10 The terms are often used as virtual synonyms. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, ETHICS IN
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 211 (rev. ed. 1995) (“Authority in general can be divided into
legitimate and de facto authority. The latter either claims to be legitimate or is
believed to be so . . . .”).
11 See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79 (2d ed. 1994).
12 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897)
(“If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who
cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or
outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience.”).
13 See RAZ, supra note 10, at 215 (“I will assume that necessarily law, every legal
system which is in force anywhere, has de facto authority. That entails that the law
either claims that it possesses legitimate authority or is held to possess it, or both.”).
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So governments claim authority for their law, and legitimacy for
themselves. But how are these claims to be supported? From what
does legitimacy derive?
Here there can be no universal answer. And the local answers are
far from being purely philosophical in character. Legitimacy is surely
tied to tradition, and to public display or (as Pascal put it) “masquerade,”14 and also to effectiveness: a government that effectively provides order, security, and prosperity is more likely to be accepted as
legitimate than one that cannot deliver these goods.15 But legitimacy
has an intellectual dimension as well. Governments and their supporters make claims or arguments calculated to demonstrate their
legitimacy; and their effectiveness will depend in part on their success
in gaining acceptance for these claims.16
Claims of legitimacy will naturally draw upon the beliefs that prevail in the society which a ruler or government seeks to govern; as
these beliefs vary, the content of claims of legitimacy will vary as well.
In a society in which most people believe that God closely and benevolently administers the world, claims of legitimacy are likely to appeal
to religious premises.17 Rulers may invoke some sort of divine commission, directly or indirectly conferred. In a thoroughly secular society, by contrast, those kinds of claims will be of no use; governments
will have to appeal to other kinds of extant beliefs—to a belief that
governments “deriv[e] their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed,”18 for example. But whatever the character of the society,
there will be some body of pertinent background beliefs in which
claims of legitimacy will be grounded. Claims that manage to establish a solid connection to this set of background beliefs will have a
14 BLAISE PASCAL, PENSEES 11 (Penguin Classics ed. 1966). Pascal explained:
Our magistrates have shown themselves well aware of this mystery. Their red
robes, the ermine in which they swaddle themselves like furry cats, the lawcourts where they sit in judgement, the fleurs de lys, all this august panoply
was very necessary. If physicians did not have long gowns and mules, if
learned doctors did not wear square caps and robes four times too large,
they would never have deceived the world, which finds such an authentic
display irresistible.
15 John Finnis’s natural law theory explains governmental authority in terms of
power to provide order and coordination. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL
RIGHTS 231–59 (2d ed. 2011). In this account, authority does not depend upon
“[c]onsent, transmission, contract, [or] custom . . . .” Id. at 248.
16 For further discussion, see Steven D. Smith, Radically Subversive Speech and the
Authority of Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 348, 357–62 (1995).
17 See infra Part III.
18 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\88-3\NDL307.txt

2013]

unknown

Seq: 5

the plight of the secular paradigm

19-FEB-13

8:07

1413

chance of succeeding; claims that cannot be plausibly connected to
such prevalent beliefs will be vulnerable.
We can describe this body of pertinent background beliefs as a
“paradigm of legitimacy.”19 The term immediately calls for qualifications. First, there is no suggestion here that every society has some
coherent and canonical legitimating creed to which all members of
the society subscribe. “Paradigm” must not be taken too stiffly; to
describe the pertinent background beliefs as a “paradigm” is not to
imply that those beliefs form a self-conscious, or unified, or coherent,
or static philosophy. On the contrary, the background beliefs are
likely to be diverse, and contested and evolving. Like Hart’s “rule of
recognition,” they may be tacitly assumed and only faintly understood
by those who rely on them; they may be extrapolated from practice as
much as consciously articulated.20 Just as terms like “feudalism” and
“Enlightenment” are invented after the fact in an effort to capture the
central commitments and practices of an earlier time (and even after
their invention historians will debate how fully and accurately such
terms describe the earlier period), so also a society’s “paradigm of
legitimacy” may be mostly presupposed, and contestable on both
descriptive and normative levels. And yet in much the same way that
the law moves to “work itself pure” through a process of ongoing
reflection in response to contestation,21 even so as a government’s
legitimacy is asserted, and questioned, and defended, the underlying
structure of legitimating premises or beliefs—what I am calling the
“paradigm of legitimacy”—is brought into the open, and polished up,
and sometimes repaired or revised.
Or rejected. We come here to a second qualification. Paradigms
of legitimacy can evolve or undergo refinement, but they can also be
discarded and replaced. A paradigm describable as “Romanitas” is
over time replaced by a more Christian paradigm, which in turn is
19 The notion of a “paradigm” as a central explanatory concept is associated with
Thomas Kuhn’s work on the history of science. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF
SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996); see infra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
In a later postscript, Kuhn acknowledged that he had used the term in different
senses. What Kuhn called the “sociological” sense is close to what the term will mean
here; “the term ‘paradigm’ . . . stands for the entire constellation of beliefs, values,
techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community.” KUHN, supra, at
175. By a “paradigm of legitimacy,” of course, we refer not to “the entire constellation
of beliefs” shared by a community, but to that subset of such beliefs and values that
bears on questions of political legitimacy.
20 See HART, supra note 11, at 101 (“For the most part the rule of recognition is
not stated, but its existence is shown in the way in which particular rules are identified,
either by courts or other officials or private persons or their advisers.”).
21 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 400–03 (1986).
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displaced by a more secular and democratic one.22 We will look at the
nature and causes of such “paradigm shifts” in Part II.
Before turning to this topic, though, we should briefly note a
third qualification. I have been using the term “paradigm of legitimacy” to refer to the general background beliefs held in a society that
are pertinent to concerns of legitimacy and authority—to ideas such
as the belief that all authority comes from God, or that governments
must be based on the consent of the governed. But for any given
society and government there are likely to be more local and particular legitimating beliefs and traditions as well.
Thus, in medieval and early modern Europe, disputes about the
legitimacy of rulers often turned on the interpretation of dynastic customs and understandings about rules and lines of succession. When
the king dies without a male heir, does power pass to the king’s
daughter or instead to a more distant male relative, or perhaps to the
king’s son by someone other than his wife? Or suppose the king’s
putative marriage to a first wife, and hence the legitimacy of the progeny of that union, are thrown into controversy, perhaps by doubts
about whether the woman’s prior union with the king’s brother was
actually consummated. What then? In contemporary America, similarly, the general notions of popular sovereignty and government by
consent may be widely accepted as truisms, but the question whether a
particular claimant is entitled to a particular political office can still
turn on disputes about, say, how to count imperfectly marked ballots
in a few counties of one particular state.23
A paradigm of legitimacy is typically too majestically abstract to be
able to answer these kinds of nitpicky but potentially decisive questions of fact, procedure, and local tradition. So we might say that the
paradigm furnishes supportive but not sufficient conditions of governmental legitimacy.
II. THE MAINTENANCE

AND

REPLACEMENT

OF

PARADIGMS

If all members of a society were of one mind with respect to the
background beliefs that are pertinent to legitimacy, maintenance of a
paradigm of legitimacy would be a simple task. In reality, that blessed
(or suffocating) condition of unanimity is unlikely to obtain in any
complex society. The background beliefs to which rulers appeal, or
which they tacitly presuppose, will be accepted by some subjects but
questioned or rejected by others; and interpretations of those beliefs
22 See infra Part III.
23 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 98 (2000) (holding that hand counting of only
certain votes would be arbitrary).
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may vary significantly. Consequently, governments adopt strategies
for maintaining the paradigm and the beliefs that constitute it, and
thus their own legitimacy, under conditions of disagreement.
Such strategies can fail. As noted, their failure can sometimes
lead to a “paradigm shift” in which one paradigm of legitimacy is
replaced by another.
A. Maintenance Strategies
Maintaining a paradigm of legitimacy involves finding ways to
deal with citizens or groups who do not share the beliefs that compose
that paradigm. What to do about subjects of Rome—Jews and Christians—who are unwilling to join in the polytheistic pluralism, including emperor-worship, on which the empire is founded?24 Or about
non-Christians in a society in which Christianity supplies the background beliefs on which government and other vital institutions are
based? How should a liberal democracy deal with dissenters—theocrats, communists, fascists, anarchists, monarchists—who do not
accept that “We the People” created by and acting through some particular constitution are the fount of legitimate authority?25
The problem posed by dissenters is not limited to the immediate
threat of disruption or disobedience by the dissenters themselves.
The dissenters might be skeptical but docile. Or they might be dealt
with, in some instances anyway, by sheer force: the dissenters might be
compelled to conform, like it or not. But the perceived fact of dissent
may also subvert the power of the paradigm, even for those who might
otherwise incline to accept it. Suppose a government claims legitimacy on religious premises: some may wonder whether a government
whose authority ostensibly comes from a supremely benevolent deity
would employ brutality against the bodies and families of subjects who
are sincerely unconvinced of the government’s divine mandate. Or
imagine a government purportedly based on the consent of the governed. Even if dissenters can be silenced or suppressed, the fact that
they exist, and that they need to be suppressed, may raise doubts
about whether the government can plausibly claim the requisite
“consent.”26
24 See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
25 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
26 Such doubts might prompt the elaboration of theories of implied or constructive consent, or of alternative accounts of authority that can buttress the dominant or
official theory. See generally LESLIE GREEN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE 158–87
(1988) (discussing the “consent of the governed”).
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As a result, governments and societies more broadly adopt strategies securing support for the paradigms in which they are grounded.
The various devices that governments employ for this purpose can be
divided into strategies of assimilation and strategies of marginalization.
Strategies of the first kind attempt to lure or drag people into acceptance of the prevailing paradigm. The second kind of strategy
attempts to minimize the threat posed by dissenters by pushing them
out of view, or beyond sympathetic consideration, so that their existence will not undermine general confidence in the paradigm.
Among the common strategies of assimilation, we may notice
three: conversion, annexation, and projection. Conversion is the most
straightforward strategy; erstwhile dissenters may be induced, perhaps
by persuasion or perhaps by compulsion, to embrace the paradigm or
the background beliefs in which that paradigm is situated. Here, of
course, more politically-focused measures may join with the less politically-oriented efforts of people who are simply proponents of the
background ideas that inform and support the paradigm of legitimacy. Thus, Christians sought to promulgate the Christian Gospel
when they were a persecuted and despised minority. They were not
promoting a “paradigm of legitimacy,” but rather were spreading what
they took to be the soul-saving truth. As Christianity became the dominant and legitimating philosophy of the Roman Empire and its successors, however, political leaders joined in these efforts to promote
conversion, in part for political purposes.27 Over time, as a result of
these efforts, so-called pagans and barbarians were transformed into
Christians, sometimes by missionaries and sometimes by militant
monks, or soldiers. We will look at this development a bit more
closely in Part III.
Or, if dissenters are reluctant to change their opinions, they can
sometimes be brought into the fold by a different means: the prevailing paradigm may be extended so as to include or incorporate the
beliefs and practices of the dissenters. Neighborhoods of dissent are
thereby annexed, so to speak. In this way, as we will review in somewhat greater detail shortly, an emergent Christianity stretched to
embrace as much as it could—some would say more than it could—of
the surrounding pagan cultures.
Insofar as conversion and annexation are less than fully successful, proponents of the dominant paradigm can forecast more complete acceptance at some later date. They can claim that history—a
history projected forward rather than backward—is on their side. Perhaps pagans, Jews, and others remain recalcitrant now in resisting the
27

See infra notes 64–73 and accompanying text.
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faith, but the time will come when “every knee should bend . . . and
every tongue . . . confess that . . . Jesus is [Lord].”28 Or, to cite a more
recent instance, a sanguine Thomas Jefferson cheerfully predicts
“there is not a young man now living who will not die an Unitarian.”29
Such prophecies may seem presumptuous or, sometimes, silly. But
have not the visionaries of Enlightenment, democracy, secularism,
human rights, and Marxism all indulged in similarly sanguine
prognostications?
Of course, even the most optimistic and confident predictions do
not do away with the inconvenient fact of present disagreement. To
the extent that dissenters remain intransigent in resisting conversion
and annexation, a society may attempt to minimize their threat to the
prevailing paradigm by finding ways to marginalize them. Nonconforming minorities may be physically marginalized by being banished,
or else relegated to special neighborhoods where they are less likely to
mix with and thus contaminate the general body.30 Or dissenters and
deviants may be culturally marginalized by being assigned to categories—barbarians, pagans; heretics, schismatics; communists, socialists;
reactionaries, fundamentalists, “unreasonable”31—that brand them as
outliers. Their nonconforming beliefs and practices thus become less
threatening to the prevailing “overlapping consensus” (to borrow a
term) because it is understood or implied that they are not full or at
least fully respectable and meritorious members of the community in
any case.32
In a large and complex society, supporters of a paradigm of legitimacy will naturally resort to combinations of these strategies of assimilation and marginalization. So long as the strategies succeed, the
paradigm will remain vigorous. But what if the strategies do not
succeed?
B. Paradigm Shifts
The term “paradigm” invokes associations with Thomas Kuhn’s
influential account of science and “scientific revolutions,”33 and the
association is intended. Kuhn discussed two kinds of scientific work.
Most scientists practice “normal science”; basically, their task is to
28 Philippians 2:10–11.
29 DAVID L. HOLMES, THE FAITHS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 88 (2006).
30 See supra notes 109–113 and accompanying text.
31 See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 50, 64, 243 n.42 (1996) (discussing
culturally marginalized women who have had abortions).
32 See infra note 108 (discussing the marginalization of dissenters).
33 KUHN, supra note 19.
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acquire and assimilate new information—new data, new observations,
new experimental evidence—and to fit this new information into a
prevailing scientific paradigm (such as the Newtonian conception of
motion and gravity).34 Normal science thus consists to a large extent
of “puzzle solving” and “mopping up operations.”35 Through such
efforts, the paradigm is reinforced—and, in the process, refined and
adjusted—and the new information is domesticated and rendered
intelligible in light of the paradigm.
Occasionally, though, a paradigm falters in addressing anomalies
and puzzles, and if its failures persist the paradigm can enter a condition of “crisis.”36 Not every crisis is fatal; sometimes a paradigm may
fall into crisis and yet recover.37 But if the distress continues, the
eventual result may be that the paradigm is discarded in favor of a new
one that is more efficacious in accounting for all of the evidence (as
well as more responsive to other less dryly rational concerns and interests38). Ptolemy’s earth-anchored picture of the universe gives way to
Copernicus’s more economical and elegant sun-centered view;
Newton’s conceptions of time, space, and motion are displaced by
Einstein’s. These more sweeping and momentous changes, the result
of “extraordinary science,” constitute “paradigm shifts,” or “scientific
revolutions” akin to the political revolutions in which an ancien regime
is replaced by a revolutionary one, or a tsarist administration is
replaced by a Bolshevik government. Thus, Kuhn himself pointed out
the analogy between the sorts of transformations he was discussing in
the sciences and similar developments in politics and history.39
In a similar way, in the “normal” course of political and legal
development, as paradigms of legitimacy are being maintained by
strategies of assimilation and marginalization, they are constantly
34 Id. at 23–42.
35 Id. at 35, 24.
36 Id. at 66–76.
37 Id. at 84 (“Sometimes normal science ultimately proves able to handle the crisis-provoking problems despite the despair of those who have seen it as the end of an
existing paradigm.”).
38 See id. at 156 (discussing importance of “subjective and aesthetic considerations” in paradigm selection).
39 Id. at 92–94 (discussing parallels between scientific and political revolutions).
However, Brian Tamanaha points out to me—correctly, I think—that there are also
important differences between scientific paradigms and paradigms of legitimacy. Scientific paradigms mainly serve explanatory and predictive purposes, for example; paradigms of legitimacy have a more normative function. In addition, scientific
paradigms work and are used largely by an elite group of specialists; paradigms of
legitimacy function in larger and more eclectic populations. E-mail from Brian
Tamanaha (Aug. 24, 2011) (on file with author).
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being refined, adjusted, and extended. But it can also happen that
the strategies cease to be effective, and that a paradigm accordingly
loses its plausibility and its ability to legitimate. In such circumstances,
a “paradigm shift” can occur in which one body or family of legitimating beliefs is replaced by a fundamentally different one.
Such a shift is unlikely to be quick and clean. Like Supreme
Court Justices, and like scientific paradigms, paradigms of legitimacy
do not go gentle into that good night. Kuhn explained that in science, even as a paradigm becomes increasingly unwieldy and unsatisfactory, scientists will struggle to patch and preserve it.40 However
clumsy, however riddled with anomalies and embarrassments, a paradigm will persist until a better paradigm emerges to replace it41—how
else could scientists continue to do their job, after all?42—and even
then scientists brought up under the old paradigm will usually fight
with tenacity and devotion to defend it.43 Consequently, a paradigm
shift typically takes place over a generation or more, as older scientists
gradually die off and a new generation of scientists arises.44 As we will
see, shifts in paradigms of legitimacy exhibit similar features.
Here it will be helpful to borrow some terminology and insights
(though not any overall theory or project) from a controversial but
undeniably erudite student of recurring historical patterns—Arnold
Toynbee.45 Toynbee argued that past societies or civilizations have
40 A paradigm’s “defenders will do what we have already seen scientists doing
when confronted by anomaly. They will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc
modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict.” Id. at 78.
Indeed, “there are always some men who cling to one or another of the older views,
and they are simply read out of profession, which thereafter ignores their work.” Id.
at 19.
41 Id. at 77.
42 Cf. id. at 79 (“To reject one paradigm without simultaneously substituting
another is to reject science itself.”).
43 “[S]ome scientists, particularly the older and more experienced ones, may
resist indefinitely.” Id. at 152.
44 Id. at 144–52; see also id. at 150–51:
How, then, are scientists brought to make this transposition? Part of the
answer is that they are very often not. Copernicanism made few converts for
almost a century after Copernicus’ death. Newton’s work was not generally
accepted, particularly on the Continent, for more than half a century after
the Principia appears. Priestly never accepted the oxygen theory, nor Lord
Kelvin the electromagnetic theory, and so on.
45 Toynbee’s epic work A STUDY OF HISTORY was originally published in ten hefty
volumes over a period of years, beginning in 1933, with a subsequent volume called A
STUDY OF HISTORY: RECONSIDERATIONS (1961) [hereinafter RECONSIDERATIONS].
Although the work was generally admired for its ambition and erudition, its sweeping
scope left it vulnerable to severe judgments from other scholars. Some of these are
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typically followed a pattern that he divided (too rigidly, as critics
pointed out46) into four main stages, which he called genesis, growth,
breakdown, and disintegration. In the genesis and growth stages,
“creative minorities”47 form and lead the society in responding to
environmental, political, or other types of challenges.48 But if a challenge arises to which the society is unable to respond successfully, the
society enters the phases of breakdown and eventually, unless it rights
itself, disintegration.
In these periods of decline, the society experiences fragmentation, or “schism in the body social” and “schism in the soul.”49 The
“creative minority,” having lost its capacity to elicit the freely-conferred respect of others in the society, becomes a “dominant minority”
that rules by position and force rather than by charisma or genuine
authority.50 Other members of the society, now increasingly disaffected, become what Toynbee called an “internal proletariat.”51 “The
collected in TOYNBEE AND HISTORY (M. F. Ashley Montagu ed., 1956). See, e.g., Hugh
Trevor-Roper, Testing the Toynbee System, in TOYNBEE AND HISTORY, supra, at 122 (“He
compares himself with the Prophet Ezekiel; and certainly, at times, he is just as
unintelligible.”); id. at 124 (charging Toynbee with “intellectual hanky-panky” and “a
terrible perversion of history”). A more pedestrian criticism asserted that the work
was “too voluminous and could have been compressed without losing anything in the
clearness and completeness of its theory.” Pitirim A. Sorokin, Toynbee’s Philosophy of
History, in TOYNBEE AND HISTORY, supra, at 172, 178; see also Hans J. Morgenthau,
Toynbee and the Historical Imagination, in TOYNBEE AND HISTORY, supra, at 191, 191 (noting both admirers and critics “have looked at Mr. Toynbee’s work as a kind of monstrosity whose bigness either overwhelms or irritates them”). However, Toynbee
himself also commended a (still substantial) two-volume abridgement by D. C.
Somervell, first published in 1946. See 1 ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY vii
(D.C. Somervell abr. 1946) [hereinafter A STUDY OF HISTORY]. The abridgement is
more readily available today, and given that I will be referring only to Toynbee’s general framework and some of his concepts and terms, my citations will be to the
Somervell abridgement, and to the later volume of RECONSIDERATIONS.
46 See Ernest Barker, Dr. Toynbee’s Study of History: A Review, in TOYNBEE AND HISTORY, supra note 45, at 89, 95 (“History . . . is infinitely multiform. As I see the matter,
Dr. Toynbee imposes patterns on history, which I, for one, am far from
accepting . . . .”); see also Sorokin, supra note 45, at 172, 182 (objecting that the “conceptual scheme of ‘genesis-growth-decline,’ . . . is possibly the worst of all existing
schemes of change of civilizations”).
47 “By a creative minority I mean a ruling minority in which the creative faculty in
human nature finds opportunities for expressing itself in effective action for the benefit of all participants in the society.” RECONSIDERATIONS, supra note 45, at 305.
48 A STUDY OF HISTORY, supra note 45, at 48–243.
49 Id. at 371, 429.
50 Id. at 371–75.
51 Id. at 375–403; see also id. at 246:
[W]hen, in the history of any society, a creative minority degenerates into a
dominant minority which attempts to retain by force a position that it has
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true hall-mark of the proletarian,” he explained, “is neither poverty
nor humble birth but a consciousness—and the resentment that this
consciousness inspires—of being disinherited from his ancestral place
in society.”52 Eventually a new “creative minority” may arise to address
the current challenges, and a new society emerges.53
Whether or not Toynbee accurately described the course of civilizations, and without supposing any deterministic course of history
(something that, contrary to critics’ accusations, Toynbee himself
denied54), the conditions he described can be applied to paradigms of
legitimacy. When a paradigm’s proponents (analogous to Toynbee’s
“creative minority”) are effective in maintaining it, they creatively
deploy the various strategies of assimilation and marginalization to
uphold the legitimacy of the paradigm, and of the government
founded on that paradigm. Conversely, as we will see, when these
strategies fail in their task of including and excluding, the paradigm
can come to seem imposed and oppressive, the government and its
laws begin to lose their authority and to become merely coercive and
“dominant,” and many of the government’s subjects withdraw their
willing engagement and support. The result can be breakdown or disintegration and, possibly, eventually, the emergence of a new paradigm of legitimacy.
Our discussion thus far has been mostly in general terms. It may
be helpful to consider, in overview at least, how these strategies and
processes have worked in leading to the political and legal world we
currently inhabit.
III. SETTING

THE

STAGE
OF THE

SECULARISM: THE RISE
CHRISTIAN PARADIGM

FOR

AND

DECLINE

Two millennia ago, the political ancestor of our current governmental institutions was the Roman Empire, which emerged in the first
ceased to merit, this change in the character of the ruling element provokes,
on the other side, the secession of a proletariat which no longer admires and
imitates its rulers and revolts against its servitude.
52 Id. at 377. Toynbee made clear that he was not following “the celebrated
Marxist modern usage” of the term, but instead intended to include “all ‘displaced
persons.’ ” RECONSIDERATIONS, supra note 45, at 306–07.
53 A STUDY OF HISTORY, supra note 45, at 244–46. Toynbee argued that the disintegration of the old society or civilization was often accompanied by what he called a
“Time of Troubles” followed by a “heroic age” of violent disruption or incursions by
an “external proletariat”—the “barbarian” invaders of Rome were a classical example—of persons outside the geographical borders of the society who, perceiving its
weakness, mount assaults on the society. Id., at 403–20.
54 See infra notes 230–31 and accompanying text.
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century BCE when the Roman Republic collapsed under the weight of
internecine strife. The political culture of the empire is sometimes
described as Romanitas—a constructive blend of traditional Roman
commitments to law and civic virtue, grounded in and supported by a
flexible polytheism including, importantly, the cult of deified emperors, and supplemented to some extent by Hellenistic philosophies
such as Stoicism and neo-Platonism.55 The Roman culture’s capacious receptivity to a variety of deities and religions gave it flexibility
and an impressive power to assimilate and incorporate conquered
peoples.56
But not everyone was assimilable. In particular, the adherents of
monotheistic faiths—Jews and Christians—were unwilling to accept
the empire’s sprawling polytheism, or to sacrifice to supposedly divine
emperors.57 Hence, although Judaism was officially accepted under
the Roman regime, misunderstandings and conflicts were frequent.
The Romans subjected Jews to a special tax, and they brutally crushed
Jewish uprisings that began in CE 66, 117, and 135.58 Eventually, the
emperor Hadrian banned circumcision throughout the empire and
re-founded Jerusalem as a Roman city, called Aelia Capitolina, which
was dedicated to the worship of Jupiter, Bacchus, Sarapis and other
pagan deities, and from which Jews were excluded.59 Christians,
though often tolerated within the empire, were officially outlawed
beginning in the reign of Nero,60 and they were subjected to sporadic
55 For a good account of how religion infused political practice and authority in
the Roman Empire, see PAUL STEPHENSON, CONSTANTINE 13–37 (2009). For a learned
overview and analysis of the various elements of Romanitas, see CHARLES NORRIS COCHRANE, CHRISTIANITY AND CLASSICAL CULTURE (1940). On the deification of emperors,
see HANS-JOSEF KLAUCK, THE RELIGIOUS CONTEXT OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY 250–330
(Brian McNeil trans., 2000).
56 Charles Freeman explains that
[l]ocal gods would be merged into the Roman pantheon—a provincial god
of thunder could simply be seen as Zeus or Jupiter in a different guise—with
the result that a complex of interlocking rituals and sacred sites could sustain local cultures without undermining Roman supremacy. Over one or
two generations of Roman rule, provincial elites, ancient or newly created,
would come to recognise that it was in their interests to cooperate in the
long-term survival of the empire.
CHARLES FREEMAN, A.D. 381: HERETICS, PAGANS, AND THE DAWN OF THE MONOTHEISTIC
STATE 18 (2008).
57 See ROBERT A. MARKUS, CHRISTIANITY AND THE SECULAR 20–21 (2006).
58 See generally MARTIN GOODMAN, ROME AND JERUSALEM (2007) (chronicling the
conflict between the Roman and Jewish worlds).
59 Id. at 460–64.
60 Henry Chadwick, The Early Christian Community, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF
CHRISTIANITY 41–46 (John McManners ed., 1990).
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but savage persecutions.61 These minorities were, in Toynbee’s terms,
“internal proletariats.”
As authority and order in the Empire began to break down in the
third century, the emperors Decian and Valerian instituted ferocious
and thoroughgoing persecutions and purges of anyone who would
not sacrifice to the gods before special commissioners.62 The
emperor Diocletian renewed the purge of Christians in the early
fourth century. Robert Markus observes that “[i]n the Great Persecution at the beginning of the fourth century, the forces of Roman conservatism rallied in a last attempt to eliminate a dangerous threat to
the traditional consensus.”63
These strategies failed to achieve unity and stability in the
empire. Consequently, over the next century or so, the empire underwent a transformation from paganism and traditional Romanitas to
Christianity and Christendom. Exactly how this change occurred and
when it was effectively consummated present questions to which historians have given very different answers. One common interpretation maintains that by the third and fourth centuries CE (sometimes
described as an “Age of Anxiety,”64 or a period of “senescence”65),
paganism had ceased to satisfy people’s spiritual and intellectual
needs. Romans increasingly turned to Eastern “mystery cults” such as
Mithraism and, eventually, to Christianity because these faiths offered
a more adequate and satisfying approach to life and death. In this
vein, the Belgian scholar Franz Cumont argued that by late antiquity,
“[t]he old national religion of Rome was dead,”66 the Swiss historian
61 Before the mid-third century, persecutions of Christians were usually local and
temporary but also draconian:
Public executions for any crime were made especially unpleasant since they
were supposed to act as a deterrent. They were also often included in public
entertainments. Not all Christians were killed. Men might be sent to labour
in the appalling conditions of imperial mines, while women were sometimes
sent to work in brothels. On other occasions fines or imprisonment were
used, again in the hope of persuading the accused to recant. When the
death sentence was imposed, it was often inflicted in extremely savage ways,
even by Roman standards. Usually the crowd revelled in the slaughter . . . .
ADRIAN GOLDSWORTHY, HOW ROME FELL 98 (2009).
62 HENRY CHADWICK, THE EARLY CHURCH 118 (rev. ed. 1993).
63 MARKUS, supra note 57, at 21.
64 See generally E.R. DODDS, PAGAN AND CHRISTIAN IN AN AGE OF ANXIETY (1965)
(relating the shared experiences of pagans and Christians in the period between Marcus Aurelius and Constantine).
65 JACOB BURCKHARDT, THE AGE OF CONSTANTINE THE GREAT 215 (Moses Hadas
trans., 1949).
66 FRANZ CUMONT, THE ORIENTAL RELIGION IN ROMAN PAGANISM 104 (Filiquarian
reprint, first published 1906).
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Jacob Burckhardt asserted that “paganism [was] in full process of dissolution . . . mortally weakened by internal disintegration and willful
intermixture from without,”67 and the Oxford historian E. R. Dodds
contended that “[i]n the fourth century paganism appears as a kind of
living corpse.”68 Christianity came to prevail, Dodds thought, because
it offered greater certainty and meaning, because it “was open to
all . . . [,] accept[ing] the manual worker, the slave, the outcast,” and
because it was “a religion of lively hope, [holding] out to the disinherited the conditional promise of a better inheritance in another
world.”69 Burckhardt explained that
the great mass felt attracted by the forgiveness of sins which was
made prominent, by the immortality of the soul which was promised, and by the mystery which surrounded the sacraments and
which for many was surely only a parallel to the pagan mysteries.
The slave was attracted by Christian freedom and brotherly love,
and many an unworthy convert by the very considerable alms which
were bestowed with true impartiality . . . .70

On this view, the emperor Constantine’s embrace of Christianity
is sometimes interpreted as a political move to place the empire on a
more secure foundation. Constantine is sometimes viewed as a “cynical opportunist.”71 For Jacob Burckhardt, Constantine was “essentially
unreligious” but was “driven without surcease by ambition and lust for
power.”72 The emperor decided to support Christianity
[w]hen he became convinced by the significant growth of the
[Christian] community, by the clearly developed character of its
hierarchy, by the peculiar form of its synodic organization, and by
67 BURCKHARDT, supra note 65, at 127–28; cf. PAUL VEYNE, WHEN OUR WORLD
BECAME CHRISTIAN 136 (Janet Lloyd trans., 2010) (observing that “paganism, lacking
both dogma and orthodoxy, had disintegrated into a confused crowd of deities and
cults that hardly merited the name of religion.”).
68 DODDS, supra note 64, at 132.
69 Id. at 134–35.
70 BURCKHARDT, supra note 65, at 125. For a subtler variation on this theme,
albeit with a focus more on the comparative abilities of paganism, Eastern cults, and
Christianity to support a sense of community, see PETER BROWN, THE WORLD OF LATE
ANTIQUITY 49–81 (1971). In a similar vein, see generally RODNEY STARK, CITIES OF
GOD (2006) (detailing Christianity’s rise over paganism as an urban movement in the
Roman Empire). The eminent French historian Paul Veyne, speaking as “an unbeliever,” VEYNE, supra note 67, at 24, argues for the “manifest superiority [of Christianity] over paganism.” Id. at 17. Nonetheless, Veyne attributes the eventual triumph of
Christianity not to this superiority but rather to the exertions of Constantine and his
successors. Id. at 121.
71 ADRIAN MURDOCH, THE LAST PAGAN 5 (2003).
72 BURCKHARDT, supra note 65, at 292.
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the entire character of contemporary Christianity that a support for
the throne might be contrived out of this enormous power.73

A very different interpretation holds that on the eve of Constantine’s conversion to Christianity, far from being exhausted, paganism
was flourishing while Christianity remained weak. Christianity eventually triumphed not because it better met spiritual or intellectual
needs—on the contrary, at least as depicted by a scholar such as Ramsay MacMullen, pagan religion was generally superior in this respect—
but rather because of the forcible suppression of paganism by Constantine and his successors.74 Paganism succumbed, gradually, to “the
murderous intolerance of the now dominant religion.”75 In this interpretation, Constantine found no political advantage in supporting
Christianity; rather, the emperor-to-be was a sincere and zealous convert.76 In a variation on this view, H. A. Drake contends that imperial
policy under Constantine was broadly tolerant and inclusive. However, the effort of the emperor Julian in the mid-fourth century to
restore paganism by legally marginalizing Christianity77 revived Christian memories and fears of the persecutions under Diocletian earlier
in the century, thereby provoking a repressive backlash following
Julian’s death.78
Whatever the causal currents, by the end of the fourth century
emperors had become committed to a new strategy and a new paradigm. Rather than attempting to eliminate Christianity as a subversive
threat to Romanitas, they came to embrace and promote Christianity
as a more promising basis for authority and order. Peter Heather
explains:
73 Id. at 279.
74 RAMSAY MACMULLEN, CHRISTIANITY AND PAGANISM IN THE FOURTH TO EIGHTH
CENTURIES 1–32 (1997); see also FREEMAN, supra note 56. See generally BURCKHARDT,
supra note 65, at 279 (detailing the eventual support of Christianity by Constantine).
75 MACMULLEN, supra note 74, at 14.
76 For an overview of the debate and an argument that Constantine was genuinely Christian, see PETER J. LEITHART, DEFENDING CONSTANTINE 79–96 (2010). See also
DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, CHRISTIANITY 191 (2010) (“There is no doubt that he came
to a deeply personal if rather capricious involvement in the Christian faith . . . .”); cf.
VEYNE, supra note 67, at 121 (“All in all, the Christianization of the ancient world
constituted a revolution set in motion by a single individual, Constantine, with
motives that were exclusively religious.”).
77 See ROBERT LOUIS WILKEN, THE CHRISTIANS AS THE ROMANS SAW THEM 165–66
(2d ed. 2003) (“Julian . . . initiated a frontal attack on the Christian movement, using
the law to restrict Christian influence and the power and prestige of his office to
promote the practice of the traditional pagan rites.”).
78 See H.A. DRAKE, CONSTANTINE AND THE BISHOPS 437 (2000).
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Roman imperialism had claimed, since the time of Augustus, that
the presiding divinities had destined Rome to conquer and civilize
the world. The gods had supported the Empire in a mission to
bring the whole of humankind to the best achievable state, and had
intervened directly to choose and inspire Roman emperors. After
Constantine’s public adoption of Christianity, the long-standing
claims about the relation of the state to the deity were quickly, and
surprisingly easily, reworked . . . . The claim that the Empire was
God’s vehicle, enacting His will in the world, changed little: only the
nomenclature was different. Likewise, while emperors could no
longer be deified, their divine status was retained in ChristianRoman propaganda’s portrayal of God as hand-picking individual
emperors to rule with Him, and partly in His place, over the human
sphere of His cosmos.79

This transformation was resisted by the emperor Julian,80 for
example, and the patrician Symmachus.81 Paganism lingered on both
in the countryside and in enclaves like Athens for decades, even centuries.82 But by the end of the fourth century, paganism was a
depleted and marginal element in the Roman world.
Thus occurred a paradigm shift, from Romanitas to Christianity.
Just when the shift was complete is of course a question on which
views differ. The change is variously dated to Constantine’s conversion,83 to the death of Julian “the Apostate” in 363,84 to the emperor
79 PETER HEATHER, THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 123 (2006).
80 See generally MURDOCH, supra note 71, at 135–36 (noting Julian’s opposition to
the Christianity movement in the Roman empire); CHADWICK, supra note 62, at 155.
81 See CHADWICK, supra note 62, at 167.
82 See PETER BROWN, POWER AND PERSUASION IN LATE ANTIQUITY 129 (1992)
(“[P]olytheists firmly established in small cities all over the eastern empire . . . up to
and beyond the end of the sixth century.”); see also BROWN, supra note 70, at 73 (“And
even a century and a half after the battle for the public faith of the empire was lost to
Christianity, the philosopher Proclus would be writing, in the mood of a still evening
after thunder, intimate hymns to the gods and a totally pagan ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.”). Note, however:
In rural districts the country folk were deeply attached to old pagan customs,
especially those associated with birth, marriage, and death. In the Western
provinces the pastoral problem for centuries was to stamp out pagan superstitions among the peasants on the land. But in the towns, even in such
Christian citadels as Syria and Asia Minor, clandestine rites, including occasional sacrifices, continued to be practiced as late as the seventh century.
CHADWICK, supra note 62, at 168–69.
83 Cf. AVERIL CAMERON, CHRISTIANITY AND THE RHETORIC OF EMPIRE 4 (1991)
(“Some modern books give the impression that the conversion of Constantine
brought about an immediate transformation of society, but the truth was far
otherwise.”).
84 See MURDOCH, supra note 71, at 6.
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Theodosius’s proscription of pagan worship in 391 and 392,85 to Theodosius’s defeat of the pagan forces of Arbogast in 394,86 or to the
gradual suppression and marginalization of paganism over the fifth
and sixth centuries.87 The reality is that the shift from classical
Romanitas to Christianity was a process that took centuries to unfold,
and historians will no doubt continue to debate when (if ever) the
transformation was consummated. Because Christianity did not so
much repudiate classical themes, categories, and practices as adopt,
incorporate, and rework many of them88—baptize or Christianize
them, we might say—it is very hard to judge when the old had been
successfully replaced by the new. By one view, in fact, Western Europe
did not become truly Christianized until after the Protestant Reformation89 (by which time the breakup of Christendom was already
underway).90
Peter Brown expresses a more standard view. Brown argues that
Christian rhetoric and culture of the fourth century was not distinctively Christian, and exhibited an easy blending and acceptance of
85 See FREEMAN, supra note 56, at 119–22 (discussing Theodosius’s anti-pagan
laws). Rodney Stark argues, though, that these proscriptions were deliberately underenforced, see STARK, supra note 70, at 196–99, and he points out that “Theodosius,
the emperor who, according to Gibbon, extirpated paganism, appointed nearly as
many men who were openly pagans as he did Christians to the positions of consuls
and prefects.” Id., at 200.
86 See VEYNE, supra note 67, at 104 (“But what put an end to paganism was not so
much that ban of 392, but the imminent defeat of the pagan party in battle, soon
after, in 394.”).
87 See generally BROWN, supra note 70, at 96–136 (chronicling the expansion of
Christianity from years 300–600); MACMULLEN, supra note 74, at 1–32 (describing the
efforts of Christian leadership to suppress pagan acts and practices in eliminating all
other religious alternatives).
88 See infra notes 106–08 and accompanying text. This incorporation of elements
of the former paradigm is typical of new paradigms. However:
Since new paradigms are born from old ones, they ordinarily incorporate
much of the vocabulary and apparatus, both conceptual and manipulative,
that the traditional paradigm had previously employed. But they seldom
employ these borrowed elements in quite the traditional way.
KUHN, supra note 19, at 149.
89 See also MACMULLEN, supra note 74, at 152 (“I make no attempt to determine
when . . . paganism had disappeared for good . . . . [I]n fact the event in some sense, I
would say, never ended, at least not if the disappearance of paganism is what’s in
question.”). See generally KEITH THOMAS, RELIGION AND THE DECLINE OF MAGIC 51–78
(1971) (discussing how the Protestant Reformation attempted to take the magic out
of religion in sixteenth and seventeenth century England).
90 Peter Gay’s notable history interprets the European Enlightenment as a kind
of return to paganism. PETER GAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1966).
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classical ingredients. Over the next century or so, however, this condition changed.91 Christians developed “a new model of power.”92
The promotion of the Christian paradigm by late Roman emperors and their successors and supporters involved all of the strategies of
assimilation and marginalization outlined in the previous Section.
The project of converting erstwhile pagans and barbarians operated
on various levels and through various means. Massive international
councils of bishops and theologians were convened and supervised by
emperors, with the goal of formulating Christian doctrines into universally acceptable (and enforceable) creeds.93 Christian bishops and
thinkers—and artisans, architects, artists, musicians, and others—
undertook to present these doctrines through a variety of media and
on both crudely popular and intellectually sophisticated levels.94 The
teachings were promulgated to erstwhile pagans and barbarians by an
army of dedicated missionaries like Columbanus, Boniface, and Ulfilas.95 Monks and ascetics, such as the dramatic “Stylites” who lived
atop pillars for years or even decades, provided inspirational or at
least impressive models of faithful devotion.96
Much of the persuasion was indirect. As emperors came to favor
Christianity, acceptance of the new religion became conducive to
career advancement. Bishops became major centers and sources of
91
92
93

See PETER BROWN, AUTHORITY AND THE SACRED 11–15 (1995).
Id. at 19.
See PHILLIP JENKINS, JESUS WARS 21–25 (2010); see also NORMAN F. CANTOR, THE
CIVILIZATION OF THE MIDDLE AGES 49 (rev. ed. 1993) (“Early in his imperial career
Constantine sensed that the church could act as backbone for the empire. Hence he
made desperate attempts to preserve the unity of the church . . . .”).
94 Cf. CAMERON, supra note 83, at 8. Cameron wrote:
It is true of Christianity (and one of its major strengths) that it was inclusive
in a way in which pagan culture always remained elitist; the most sensitive
Christian thinkers were acutely aware of this advantage and paid a great deal
of attention to its exploitation by the effective presentation of the faith at all
intellectual and society levels, and by the widest possible means. But that is
quite different from suggesting, as is often done, that the general adoption
of Christianity implied the defeat of the intellect and the triumph of popular
religion. Any halfway adequate explanation of the phenomenon must do as
much justice to the appeal of Christianity to the most highly educated, and
to its most sophisticated theological formulations, as to any supposedly popular piety or superstition.
Id.
95 See generally Henry Mayr-Harting, The West: The Age of Conversion (700-1050), in
THE OXFORD HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 60, at 92 (characterizing the Christian movement as being driven not by great individuals, but instead by “missionary
drive”).
96 See MACCULLOCH, supra note 76, at 200–10.
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influence and assistance to the poor.97 Impressive new Christian
churches commanded the avenues and skylines of major cities,
thereby Christianizing the urban ethos.98
When persuasion failed to convert, force was often applied.99
Mobs and troops of militant monks, instigated sometimes by bishops,
sacked pagan temples or shrines and assaulted and sometimes killed
prominent pagans (like the noted scholar Hypatia of Alexandria).100
Later, when Charlemagne conquered the Saxons they were compelled
to become Christians;101 the same was required of the invading Danes
when they were defeated by the English king Alfred.102 Centuries
later still, after Christians re-conquered the Iberian Peninsula, Muslims and Jews were permitted to remain in Spain only if they could
persuade suspicious authorities that they had converted to Christianity.103 In these ways, former outsiders were recruited, willingly or
reluctantly, into the Christian paradigm.
Christian leaders also made use of the devices of annexing or
incorporating erstwhile pagan practices and beliefs into the Christian
system (and critics might object that this statement reverses the direction of incorporation).104 Keith Thomas recalls:
[T]he notorious readiness of the early Christian leaders to assimilate elements of the old paganism into their own religious prac97 See BROWN, supra note 82 at 89–103, 119.
98 Id. at 120–21.
99 For a discussion of the use of force to suppress paganism and establish Christianity, see generally FREEMAN, supra note 56, and MACMULLEN, supra note 74.
100 See BROWN, supra note 82, at 108, 113–16. To be fair, in those tumultuous
times, the rampaging often ran both ways, and it was not always perfectly clear “who
started it.” See DAVID BENTLEY HART, ATHEIST DELUSIONS 3–44, 120 (2009).
101 HYWELL WILLIAMS, EMPEROR OF THE WEST 77–82 (paperback ed. 2011); see also
ROGER COLLINS, EARLY MEDIEVAL EUROPE 300–1000, at 281–86 (3d ed. 2010) (describing Charlemagne’s subjugation of the Saxons).
102 See COLLINS, supra note 101, at 362.
103 MACCULLOCH, supra note 76, at 585–90.
104 See Robert Markus, From Rome to the Barbarian Kingdoms, in THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 60, at 66–67. Markus wrote:
By the middle of the fourth century, Christianity had gone a long way
towards assimilating the dominant culture of pagan Romans. An easy symbiosis had come into being between the cultivated pagan and the educated
Christian. . . . Right across the social scale, religion made little perceptible
difference to the outward shape of life. Many Christians continued to take
part in traditional Roman festivities; they sometimes shocked their bishops
by dancing in church, getting drunk at celebrations in the cemeteries, consulting magicians, or resorting to charms to cure their troubles, just as did
other people.
Id.
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tice . . . . The ancient worship of wells, trees[,] and stones was not so
much abolished as modified, by turning pagan sites into Christian
ones and associating them with a saint rather than a heathen divinity. The pagan festivals were similarly incorporated into the Church
year. New Year’s Day became the feast of the Circumcision; May
Day was SS. Philip and James; Midsummer Eve the Nativity of St
John the Baptist. Fertility rites were converted into Christian
processions and the Yule Log was introduced into celebrations of
the birth of Christ.105

When Pope Gregory the Great sent missionaries to proselytize
Anglo-Saxon England, he explicitly instructed them to retain and
incorporate as much of the Anglo-Saxon religion as possible.106
Projection also figured in the Christian expansion. The Christian
religion was destined ultimately to prevail, Christians believed,
because the earthly struggle was in a sense a consolidation of a struggle that had already been fought in heaven, and won. Thus, their
ultimate triumph was historically guaranteed.107
Despite these confident predictions, and these efforts at conversion and annexation, some remained recalcitrant. Such dissenters
were marginalized108 or excluded (or sometimes eliminated).
Marginalization of outsiders became particularly severe when, begin105 THOMAS, supra note 89, at 47–48.
106 See PETER HUNTER BLAIR, THE WORLD OF BEDE 63 (1970). According to Blair:
The [pagan] temples were by no means to be destroyed, but only the images
which they housed. If the temples were well built they were to be consecrated to the service of God so that the people might continue to worship
in familiar places. They should not be deprived of their customary sacrifices
of oxen, but on appropriate days they should build wooden booths in the
neighbourhood of former temples, now converted to Christian use, and celebrate with religious feasting, their animals no longer sacrificed to devils,
but killed for their own food with thanksgiving to God.
Id.
107 Peter Brown explains that:
the conflict between Christianity and paganism was presented, in fourth- and
fifth-century Christian sources, as having been fought out in heaven rather
than on earth. The end of paganism occurred with the coming of Christ to
earth. It was when He was raised on the Cross on Calvary—and not, as we
more pedestrian historians tend to suppose, in the reign of Theodosius I—
that heaven and earth rang with the crash of falling temples. The alliance of
the Christian church with Christian emperors, to abolish sacrifice and to
close and destroy the temples, was not more than a last, brisk mopping-up
operation, that made manifest on earth a victory already won, centuries
before, by Christ, over the shadowy empire of the demons.
BROWN, supra note 91, at 4–5.
108 On the marginal status of pagan thinkers in a largely Christianized empire, see
BROWN, supra note 82, at 145 (“It would only be in the intimate, domestic friendship
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ning in the twelfth century, Jews were often clustered in ghettos,
required to wear a yellow identifying label, expelled from England
and France (and later from Spain and Portugal),109 and subjected to
periodic pogroms.110 Ostensibly or formerly Christian persons of
nonconforming or subversive opinions or habits could be classified as
heretics or schismatics, or witches, and could be subjected to the discipline of the Inquisition or other forms of prosecution or exclusion.111
Large communities of heretical dissenters, such as the Albigensians,
might find themselves the target of a domestic Crusade.112
Through these methods, some peaceful and some militant or
brutal, leaders and rulers were able to maintain Christianity as the
basic background belief and source of legitimacy for centuries. That
statement of course does not convey the enormous complexities, contestations, and convulsions that occurred within Christendom over
this period. There were epic debates about what Christian teaching
actually was, or should be,113 and about the political implications of
that teaching. Christian ideas, originally expressed through the adoption and conversion of classical categories and terms, were continually
reshaped by new influxes from classical or outside sources,114 such as
the reception of Aristotle in the thirteenth century. And yet the fact is
that for centuries, not only popes but also kings argued about and
justified political authority largely on Christian premises.115
The paradigm of legitimacy, in short, was distinctively Christian.
It was maintained by the familiar strategies of assimilation and
marginalization. And then . . . those strategies began to lose their
of the circle of their colleagues, students, and wives and in their dreams—when the
gods visited them with gentle familiarity—that the last philosophers felt at ease.”).
109 See generally B. NETANYAHU, THE ORIGINS OF THE INQUISITION IN FIFTEENTH CENTURY SPAIN (2d ed. 1995) (discussing, as the title suggests, the causes of the Spanish
Inquisition).
110 CANTOR, supra note 93, at 366–67.
111 See MACCULLOCH, supra note 76, at 396–401, 686–87.
112 See id. at 387–88.
113 See generally JENKINS, supra note 93 (describing the often violent struggle in the
early centuries of the Church to define the fundamental teachings of Christianity).
114 Cf. LOUIS DUPRÉ, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF MODERN CULTURE 6 (2005)
(“[T]he classical culture . . . had never ceased to influence the medieval one . . . .”).
115 See WILLIAM CHESTER JORDAN, EUROPE IN THE HIGH MIDDLE AGES 85–87 (2001);
WALTER ULLMANN, PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES
57–114 (1961). See generally BRIAN TIERNEY, THE CRISIS OF CHURCH AND STATE
1050–1300 (1964) (discussing the struggle for power between secular and Christian
rulers and how each legitimized their authority in the eleventh through fourteenth
centuries).
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force, and the Christian paradigm came to relinquish its hold. And a
new paradigm of legitimacy emerged to replace it.
IV. THE RISE

AND

DECLINE

OF THE

SECULAR PARADIGM

And what was that new paradigm? For present purposes, and subject to a variety of qualifications and questions, we can call it the “secular paradigm.”
To be sure, that description notices only part of the body of
beliefs that emerged with respect to questions of governmental legitimacy. Another crucial part of the more modern paradigm has been
that government should be based on the consent of the governed, and
should represent them and act in their interests. So it would perhaps
be more accurate to describe the views that emerged with the breakdown of Christendom as constituting a “democratic paradigm.” For
present purposes, though, the essential feature of the newer paradigm, and the feature that distinguished it most directly from the
more top-down and theistic paradigm of medieval Christendom, was
its assumption that legitimate government is “secular” in character.116
A. The Ascendency of the Secular Paradigm
It may be best to start with the present, and with a general statement. Charles Taylor begins a major, much discussed study of A Secular Age by observing that:
[W]hereas the political organization of all pre-modern societies was
in some way connected to, based on, guaranteed by some faith in,
or adherence to God, or some notion of ultimate reality, the modern Western state is free from this connection. Churches are now
separate from political structures (with a couple of exceptions, in
Britain and the Scandinavian countries, which are so low-key and
undemanding as not really to constitute exceptions). Religion or its
absence is largely a private matter. The political society is seen as
that of believers (of all stripes) and non-believers alike.117

Taylor’s description provokes central questions, some of which
we may notice but thankfully need not answer. There are the usual
questions about how and when. How did the Christian worldview
come to be displaced by a secular one, at least in some cultural
domains? Different historians and theorists emphasize different influences: nominalistic philosophical and voluntaristic theological devel116 In fact, medieval thinkers also believed that government is “secular,” but they
understood the term in very different ways. For a discussion, see STEVEN D. SMITH,
THE DISENCHANTMENT OF SECULAR DISCOURSE 112–50 (2010).
117 CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 1 (2007).
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opments of the late Middle Ages and early modern period,118 the
Protestant Reformation and the political reaction to the ensuing wars
of religion,119 the achievements of science,120 and the organized
efforts of thinkers and movements of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries.121 Taylor’s own book is an extended reflection on how contemporary secularism came to be.
And at what point did the secular paradigm become dominant?
With the Peace of Westphalia, in 1648?122 But that accord, although it
may have brought the era of the “Wars of Religion” and the ideal of
an overarching Christendom to an end,123 also ushered in the era of
the confessional state.124 So then maybe the secular paradigm triumphed with the adoption of the American Constitution? The Constitution was a deliberately secular document, as proponents of
secular government insistently point out,125 but did it require that governments must be secular? If it did, this ostensibly central feature
seems somehow to have been missed by founding era citizens and
political leaders; they appointed official chaplains and designated
118 For an illuminating study of such developments, see generally LOUIS DUPRÉ,
PASSAGE TO MODERNITY (1993).
119 See Charles Taylor, Modes of Secularism, in SECULARISM AND ITS CRITICS 31, 32
(Rajeev Bhargava ed., 1998) (“The origin point of modern Western secularism was
the wars of religion; or rather, the search in battle-fatigue and horror for a way out of
them.”); see also WOLFHART PANNENBERG, CHRISTIANITY IN A SECULARIZED WORLD
11–14, 18 (1989) (discussing the rise of secularism as a reaction to wars of religion).
120 See OWEN CHADWICK, THE SECULARIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN MIND IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 161–88 (1990); MARK LILLA, THE STILLBORN GOD 58–65 (2007).
121 See, e.g., Christian Smith, Introduction: Rethinking the Secularization of American
Public Life, in THE SECULAR REVOLUTION 1, 1 (Christian Smith ed., 2003). Smith
stresses the collaborative efforts of “waves of networks of activists who were largely
skeptical, freethinking, agnostic, atheist, or theologically liberal; who were well educated and socially located mainly in knowledge-production occupations; and who generally espoused materialism, naturalism, positivism, and the privatization or
extinction of religion.” Id.
122 Cf. Peter J. Katzenstein, Civilizational States, Secularisms, and Religions, in
RETHINKING SECULARISM, supra note 2, at 145, 145 (acknowledging though questioning the widespread “assumption that by privatizing religion, the Peace of Westphalia
left international politics fully secular”).
123 GERALD R. CRAGG, THE CHURCH AND THE AGE OF REASON, 1648–1789 (1960).
124 Craig Calhoun, Secularism, Citizenship, and the Public Sphere, in RETHINKING SECULARISM, supra note 2, at 75, 80 (“What issued from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia was
not a Europe without religion but a Europe of mostly confessional states . . . .”).
125 See generally, e.g., ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 2005) (arguing the framers and the founding documents they created
reflect an intentionally secular state). For a discussion of the significance of this feature, see generally Steven D. Smith, Our Agnostic Constitution, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120
(2008).
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national days of prayer.126 A century later, the American Supreme
Court declared that “this is a Christian nation.”127
So then perhaps the dominance of the secular paradigm came
about in the twentieth century? But at mid-century the Supreme
Court asserted, in just slightly more ecumenical terms, that “we are a
religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.”128
Even today, and despite a professed constitutional prohibition on governmental endorsement of religion,129 the nation’s currency awkwardly reminds Americans of the national motto—“In God We
Trust”—and courts have rejected constitutional challenges to the
expression.130
The question of “When?” pushes us to notice a distinction that,
though potentially crucial, often goes neglected by contemporary proponents of secular government. This distinction might be described
as one between a “secular paradigm of legitimacy” and a “paradigm of
secular legitimacy.” The first sort of position proposes secular criteria of
legitimacy; the second holds that in order to have legitimacy, governments must be secular.
As an illustration, consider the proposition presented by the Declaration of Independence as a “self-evident” truth—that legitimate
government must be based on the consent of the governed.131 That
proposition appears to be secular; it claims no theological foundation,
and it traces political legitimacy to a human and this-worldly source
(human consent), not a divine one.132 Even so, the kind of government to which subjects freely consent might conceivably be a government that supports or endorses religion in various ways;133 as noted,
126

See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., & EDWARD MCGLYNN GAFFNEY, JR., RELIGIOUS FREE524–32 (3d ed. 2011) (presenting cases and other materials on early American
communities officially recognizing religious activities).
127 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 471 (1892).
128 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
129 See, e.g., Allegheny Cnty. v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 578–79
(1989) (prohibiting a certain display of religious imagery on public property under
the First Amendment).
130 See, e.g., Newdow v. Lefevre, 598 F.3d 638, 643–46 (9th Cir. 2010).
131 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
132 To be sure, the Declaration does assert that the purpose of government is to
protect rights with which humans are “endowed by their Creator.” Id.; cf. George P.
Fletcher, In God’s Image: The Religious Imperative of Equality Under Law, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1608, 1611 (1999) (“Behind those created equal stands a Creator, who is the
source of our inalienable rights ‘to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.’ ” (citation omitted)).
133 Cf. Alfred Stepan, The Multiple Secularisms of Modern Democratic and Non-Democratic Regimes, in RETHINKING SECULARISM, supra note 2, at 114, 117. Stepan writes:
DOM
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that was evidently the kind of government that Americans in the early
republic understood themselves to be consenting to.134 Conversely,
during the earlier Christian period, it was commonly believed on religious grounds that governments should be “secular,” in the sense that
they were limited in their jurisdiction to the concerns of this world.135
Roger Williams held a similar view.136
Thus, there can be paradigms of legitimacy that are secular, and
that base legitimacy on secular criteria, but that allow for governments
that are in important respects religious. Conversely, there can be
religious or theological paradigms of legitimacy that require government to be secular.
As the Christian paradigm declined in the post-Reformation
period, what first began to emerge, it seems, was a secular paradigm of
legitimacy, not a paradigm of secular legitimacy. Thus, although the
Peace of Westphalia may plausibly be viewed as officially abandoning
the older Christian paradigm, it surely did not call for secular government. The treaty’s central principle of cuius regio eius religio—the
religion of the prince shall be the religion of the realm—implied that
the prince did not receive authority from God or the church, as in the
Christian paradigm, but rather the other way around: a religion
acquired its status as the religion of a principality from the prince’s
decision. In this understanding, the “secular” authority seems to be
primary, while religion’s authority is derivative. Even so, this secular
authority might nonetheless establish religion; indeed, as noted, the
treaty ushered in the era of the confessional state.137
Similarly, the “self-evident truth” that government’s authority is
derived from the consent of the governed appears to be a secular proposition.138 That proposition—and, more generally, the idea of popular sovereignty—was widely accepted in the early American
[F]or comparative purposes, . . . it is important to be aware of how many of
the existing twenty-seven members of the European Union violate U.S.
norms of a “wall of separation between the state and religion” but are nonetheless strong democracies. Indeed, any serious analysis of state policies
toward religion in the twenty-seven European Union democracies documents that 100 percent of them fund religious education in some way; 89
percent have religious education in state schools as a standard offering
(many, but not all, with the option not to attend); 44 percent fund the
clergy, and 19 percent have established religions.
Id.
134
135
136
137
138

See
See
See
See
See

supra note 126.
SMITH, supra note 116, at 112–21.
TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE 82–83 (1998).
supra note 124.
supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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Republic.139 As noted, though, the logic of the proposition does not
require, and American citizens and leaders at the founding and afterwards did not seem to interpret the proposition as requiring, government to be thoroughly secular.140 That idea—namely, that in order to
claim legitimacy government itself must confine itself to the secular—
seems to be a later and more contested arrival.141
To be sure, the more recent paradigm of secular legitimacy, as we
may call it, arguably draws support from some of the same concerns
and commitments that led to the secular paradigm of legitimacy—
more specifically, from the ideal of government by consent, from the
need for public peace, and from commitments to human equality.
The distinctive condition of the modern world, it is commonly supposed, is pluralism—religious pluralism in particular.142 Whatever
might be true in a religiously homogeneous society, in a pluralistic
world governments cannot lay claim to the consent of the governed if
they also embrace sectarian beliefs that only some of their citizens
accept. Or so it may seem. Moreover, such sectarianism would be
disruptive of civil peace and stability. Such, it is supposed, is the lesson to be learned from the “wars of religion.”143 The cuius regio eius
religio approach proved to be an untenable solution; not all subjects
could be induced to accept the religion of the prince. In addition,
given religious diversity, governmental endorsement of or support for
religion will inevitably send a message of favoritism toward some citizens and of exclusion toward others; in this way, government would
violate the fundamental commitment to treat all citizens equally.144
These arguments and conclusions are by now pervasive in the
theorizing of influential philosophers like John Rawls.145 The conclu139 GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at
329–30 (1969).
140 See supra note 132. .
141 Cf. MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 17 (asserting that their secularist conception of government “has appeared only recently in history”).
142 See id. at 9–10; RAWLS, supra note 31, at xviii–xxvi.
143 See supra note 119 and accompanying text for a discussion of the origins and
ensuing political and intellectual response to these “wars of religion.” For a vigorous
challenge to this conventional view, see WILLIAM T. CAVANAUGH, THE MYTH OF RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE (2009).
144 See MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 9; see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 687–94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). O’Connor wrote, “Endorsement
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.” Id. at 688.
145 See generally RAWLS, supra note 31, at 3–22 (discussing principles of liberty and
equality as background for democracy).
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sions are common in law as well. Thus, in the United States, the
requirement of governmental secularity is explicitly affirmed in constitutional doctrine,146 though not in the Constitution itself; other
nations like France and Turkey go further and formally embrace a
commitment to secularism in their constitutions.147 Despite ongoing
religious practices and expressions (such as the American national
motto), therefore, prevalent and official understandings appear to
embrace a sort of amalgamated secular paradigm of legitimacy and
paradigm of secular legitimacy—an amalgam that we can continue to
describe simply as the “secular paradigm.” (Although we will make
use of the distinction again later.)
B. Strategies of Secularization
The secular paradigm emerged, and it has been maintained,
under conditions in which many citizens—in some places, such as the
United States, a sizable majority148—adhere to religion in one way or
another. In securing and maintaining the secular paradigm, therefore, secular thinkers and governments grounded in the secular paradigm have employed the usual strategies of assimilation and
marginalization.
1. Promoting Secularism
Just as thinkers like Origen, Augustine, and later Aquinas developed intellectually sophisticated expositions and defenses of the
Christian worldview,149 modern scientists and philosophers have
developed similarly sophisticated elaborations of a more naturalistic
and hence secular worldview. Citations hardly seem necessary here:
almost any major (or minor) thinker of the last several centuries—
Locke, Hume, Kant, Marx, Darwin, Mill, Nietzsche, Freud, Weber—
might be cited for the proposition. And just as societies committed to
Christianity found ways to inculcate and promulgate Christian teachings through homilies, liturgy, and catechesis of various kinds, so soci146 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
147 See RAN HIRSCHL, CONSTITUTIONAL THEOCRACY 26–27 (2010). Hirschl reports
that in 1928 Turkey removed the provision that “the religion of the Turkish State is
Islam;” in 1937, the constitution was amended to provide that government should be
“republican, popular, atheist, secular, and reformist.” Id. at 27.
148 See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM & DAVID E. CAMPBELL, AMERICAN GRACE (2010)
(providing a comprehensive study of religion in modern American life and its role as
both a unifying and dividing force).
149 See supra Part III.
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eties grounded in the secular paradigm have developed ways to
communicate the secular worldview to their subjects.
One major seminary of secularization has been the public
schools. Martin Marty explains that democracy “has few temples or
churches or synagogues. But it has an ‘established church’ in the field
of public education.”150 And over at least the last few decades, the
gospel communicated in that “established church” has been a resolutely secular one. Thus, courts in the United States have been vigilant in forbidding any religious influence in the schools, such as
prayer or Bible reading.151 An attempt to eliminate the teaching of
evolution (in deference, the Supreme Court believed, to religion) was
ruled unconstitutional;152 and efforts to “balance” such teaching by
giving equal time to theories of creationism or intelligent design, or
even to warn that evolution is “only a theory,” have been sternly rebuffed in the courts.153
Proponents of a secular worldview have thus looked to public
schools as a principal ally. Writing in The Humanist, Paul Blanshard
observed: “I think the most important factor moving us toward a secu150 John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause,
100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 312 n.175 (2001) (quoting MARTIN E. MARTY, THE NEW SHAPE
OF AMERICAN RELIGION 80 (1958)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In a similar
vein, the distinguished historian of religion Sidney Mead observed that:
The public schools in the United States took over one of the basic responsibilities that traditionally was always assumed by an established church. In
this sense the public school system of the United States is its established
church.
BRUCE C. DIERENFIELD, THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL PRAYER 19 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
151 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
224–27 (1963). For a more extensive discussion, see Steven D. Smith, Constitutional
Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School Prayer Decisions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 945,
949–64 (2011). Given that the existence of religion is a fact about the world, schools
are permitted to teach about it—in history classes, for example—but they must do so
in an objective fashion.
152 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968).
153 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586 n.6 (1987); Kitzmiller v. Dover
Area Sch. Dist, 400 F. Supp. 2d 707, 711, 716–17 (M.D. Pa. 2005). Joseph Vining finds
this censoriousness curious. See JOSEPH VINING, THE SONG SPARROW AND THE CHILD 28
(2004). “Strange,” he remarks, “this struggle over the minds of young children—one
might think that the theory of evolution, appealing, simple, fertile, fascinating, like a
beautiful equation in mathematics, could fend for itself when presented to curious
young minds.” Id. But if public schools are seen as the symbol and seminary, so to
speak, of secular democracy, then it is perhaps understandable that their guardians
would insist on keeping them free of the taint of views subversive of that paradigm,
just as churchmen were keen on keeping heresy out of the church.
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lar society has been the educational factor. Our schools may not
teach Johnny to read properly, but the fact that Johnny is in school
until he is sixteen tends toward the elimination of religious superstition.”154 Charles Francis Potter, a signer of the Humanist Manifesto I,
wrote:
Education is . . . a most powerful ally of Humanism, and every American public school is a school of Humanism. What can the theistic
Sunday schools, meeting for an hour once a week, and teaching
only a fraction of the children, do to stem the tide of a five-day
program of humanistic teaching?155

More recently, Sanford Levinson argues for minimal accommodations sufficient to keep religious students in public schools precisely
because such schools will have an overall secularizing effect.156
“[C]andor requires me to admit,” Levinson says, that
one reason I would prefer [Christian fundamentalist] children . . .
to attend the public schools is precisely to increase the likelihood
that they might be lured away from the views—some of them only
foolish, others, alas, quite pernicious—of their parents. Perhaps
they will meet and begin talking with, and learning from, more secular students.157

Thus, Levinson acknowledges that “[m]y desire to ‘lure’ religious
parents back to the public schools thus has at least a trace of the spider’s web about it.”158
Officially, at least, constitutional doctrine does not embrace the
agenda of Blanshard, Potter, and Levinson. The secular curriculum is
not intended to undermine religion, but rather is presented as neutral
toward religion.159 But decisions prescribing secular public schools
do assume and assert that religion is an essentially private matter,160
and that the public order should be secular; in this way they promote,
154 James Davison Hunter, Religious Freedom and the Challenge of Modern Pluralism, in
ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES OF PEACE 54, 70 (James Davison Hunter & Os Guinness
eds., 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
156 Sanford Levinson, Some Reflections on Multiculturalism, “Equal Concern and
Respect,” and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 989,
1020 (1993).
157 Id. at 1019.
158 Id. at 1020.
159 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968).
160 See, e.g., Grand Rapids Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 398 (1985) (“ ‘[T]he
Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the
family, and institutions of private choice . . . .’ ” (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring))).
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if not a comprehensive secularism, at least a public or political secularism,161 and thus a secular paradigm of governmental legitimacy.
And yet it seems that the schools have been less successful in
inculcating secularism, or even public or political secularism, than
some secularists have hoped. Religion was a potent force—and a
potent political force—at the time of Locke, and of Jefferson, and to
the surprise of some, it remains a potent force today, at least in many
countries (including the United States).162 The continuing significance of religion has been the occasion for two of the most central
strategies employed in support of the secular paradigm.
2. Projection: the “Secularization Hypothesis.”
One of these strategies involves projection. While acknowledging
the present significance of religion, secular thinkers have repeatedly
predicted that as societies become more modern, urbanized, and educated, religion is destined to dwindle. José Casanova explains:
In one form or another, with the possible exception of Alexis de
Tocqueville, Vilfredo Pareto, and William James, the thesis of secularization was shared by all the founding fathers: from Karl Marx to
John Stuart Mill, from Auguste Comte to Herbert Spencer, from
E.B. Tylor to James Frazer, from Ferdinand Toennies to Georg Simmel, from Emile Durkheim to Max Weber, from Wilhelm Wundt to
Sigmund Freud, from Lester Ward to William G. Sumner, from
Robert Park to George H. Mead. Indeed, the consensus was such
that not only did the theory remain uncontested but apparently it
was not even necessary to test it, since everybody took it for
granted.163

In this view, the continuing existence of religion and religious
believers was a short-term hindrance. Resistance was quixotic; secularism had the massive advantage of historical inevitability.
3. Annexation and Marginalization: the Neutrality Strategy.
A second device for maintaining the secular paradigm, even in
the midst of pervasively religious populations, has been the neutrality
strategy. The basic claim, asserted by now in hundreds of judicial
161 The distinction is analogous to Rawls’s distinction between “political liberalism” and “comprehensive liberalism.” RAWLS, supra note 31, at xxix.
162 See infra notes 180–182 and accompanying text.
163 JOSÉ CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGION IN THE MODERN WORLD 17 (1994); see also
DAVID MARTIN, ON SECULARIZATION 9 (2005) (explaining “the ubiquity of secularization stories, and the varied ways they combine prescription and description”).
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decisions as well as in academic literature,164 has been that governmental secularity is neither favorable nor unfavorable to religion, but
merely neutral.
The neutrality claim sounds in both the annexation and
marginalization strategies. If it is true that a secular government is
simply neutral toward religion, then there is no incompatibility
between religion and secular government. Unthreatened, religion
and religionists ought to be able cheerfully to acquiesce in the benign
ministrations of the secular state.
This annexation, however, also entails a kind of marginalization,
as (depending on what version of secularism is being invoked)165
religion is pushed out of politics and law and restricted to the private
sphere.166 Moreover, religionists who decline to support this ostensibly “neutral” regime are depicted as obstreperous and unassimilable—as “unreasonable,” in Rawls’s framework167—and thus as
people whose views a secular liberal polity cannot be expected to
respect or accommodate. In addition to being marginalized as illiberal and unreasonable, the adherents of what is sometimes called
“strong religion” are also often depicted as pitiably ignorant and
unthinking—H. L. Mencken’s influential stories during the Scopes
trial168 are merely one manifestation of this genre169—and hence as
alien to a society that aspires to enlightened inclusiveness.
164 See, e.g., MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 5, at 9–13, 19–22. For instances and
discussion, see generally Steven D. Smith, The Paralyzing Paradox of Religious Neutrality
(San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 11-060, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1911399
165 Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor distinguish between what they call “republican” and “liberal-pluralist” versions of secularism. MACLURE & TAYLOR, supra note 5,
at 27–52. The republican versions, typified by French laı̈cité, attempt rigorously to
confine religion to the private sphere. Id. The liberal-pluralist versions are more
open to the appearance of religion in public space but nonetheless attempt to keep
government and political decision-making secular. Id.
166 See supra Part IV.B.
167 RAWLS, supra note 31, at 61, 64.
168 Perhaps the best known journalist of his day, Mencken issued regular and colorful reports from the trial, consistently deprecating William Jennings Bryan and his
supporters—he described them as “morons” and referred sardonically to “the socalled minds of these fundamentalists of upland Tennessee”—and glorifying Bryan’s
famous opponent, Clarence Darrow. See EDWARD J. LARSON, SUMMER FOR THE GODS
165 (1997). These depictions were further exaggerated in the popular play and
movie Inherit the Wind; a Time magazine review at the time contended that “[t]he
script wildly and unjustly caricatures the fundamentalists as vicious and narrow
minded hypocrites,” and “just as wildly and unjustly idealizes their opponents, as personified by Darrow.” Id. at 243 (internal quotation marks omitted). In an illuminating history of the trial and its effects, Edward Larson observed that “[a]fter the Scopes
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These strategies of using “neutrality” to incorporate and to
marginalize were on display in the case of Epperson v. Arkansas, in
which the American Supreme Court invalidated a state law prohibiting the teaching of evolution in the public schools.170 The Court
emphasized the schools’ obligation of “absolute” neutrality toward
religion; schools are constitutionally forbidden, the Court said, to do
or teach anything that would either “aid or oppose” any religion.171
The Court’s supposition, it seems, was that teaching evolution was not
inconsistent with or subversive of any religion (although the Court’s
own account of Arkansas’s reason for adopting the law contradicted
this supposition172); hence, religionists could safely accept their incorporation into a constitutional regime committed to governmental
secularity.
More tangentially, the Court inserted two curious, mocking footnotes that served no apparent purpose except to ridicule opponents
of evolution.173 These footnotes had no discernible relevance to the
Court’s legal analysis, and they arguably detracted from the stance of
benign neutrality that the Court purported to assume. Their functrial, elite American society stopped taking fundamentalists and their ideas seriously.”
Id. at 233.
169 See also CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS, GOD IS NOT GREAT 229 (2007). Hitchens suggests that religion “is a man-made imposition, and that it has been an enemy of science and inquiry, and that it has subsisted largely on lies and fears, and been the
accomplice of ignorance and guilt as well as of slavery, genocide, racism, and tyranny.” Id.
170 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968).
171 Id. at 106. (internal quotation marks omitted).
172 The Court declared that “there can be no doubt that Arkansas has sought to
prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of evolution because it is contrary to
the belief of some that the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine
as to the origin of man.” Id. at 107. But if the theory of evolution is “contrary to the
[religious] belief of some,” id., then how does the teaching of evolution in public
schools not “oppose” that species of religion? Id. at 106.
173 In footnote 9, the Court remarked:
Clarence Darrow, who was counsel for the defense in the Scopes trial, in his
biography published in 1932, somewhat sardonically pointed out that States
with anti-evolution laws did not insist upon the fundamentalist theory in all
respects. He said: “I understand that the States of Tennessee and Mississippi
both continue to teach that the earth is round and that the revolution on its
axis brings the day and night, in spite of all opposition.”
Id. at 102 n.9 (quoting CLARENCE DARROW, THE STORY OF MY LIFE 247 (1932)).
In footnote 10, the Court recited: “[Hofstadter and Metzger] refer to some of Darwin’s opponents as ‘exhibiting a kind of phylogenetic snobbery [which led them] to
think that Darwin had libeled the [human] race by discovering simian rather than
seraphic ancestors.’ ” Id. at n.10 (quoting R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE UNITED STATES 324 (1955)).
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tion, it seems, was rhetorical; they resonated with a common strategy
among proponents of secularism for marginalizing religionists whose
creeds are difficult to reconcile with the secular paradigm by depicting such believers as ignorant and unthinking.
C. The Frustrations of the Secular Strategies
For a period in the mid-twentieth century, these strategies—
namely, projecting the inevitability of secularization, and incorporating some forms of religion while marginalizing other forms by
presenting governmental secularity as “neutral” toward “religion”—
seem to have enjoyed considerable success. At least in American jurisprudence, the notions that government must be “secular,” and that a
secular government is simply “neutral” toward religion, seemed to be
widely accepted as axiomatic truths.174 Indeed, the commitment to
“neutrality” still goes largely unquestioned in the case law of the
American Supreme Court.175
Despite earlier prosperity, however, challenges to the secular paradigm have become more conspicuous and vigorous. And at present,
the strategies that worked relatively well a few decades ago seem to be
having less success in deflecting the challenges.
1. The Failure of the Secularization Hypothesis.
Writing in 1968, the sociologist Peter Berger expressed a common view in predicting that “[b]y the 21st century, religious believers
174 For further discussion and illustration, see Smith, supra note 151, at 991–1005 .
175 See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 873 (2005). For a European
example, see Svyato-Mykhaylivska Parafiya v. Ukraine, App. No. 77703/01, 2007 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 478, para. 113 (declaring “[t]he State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality”
with respect to religious beliefs), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/
pages/search.aspx?i=001-81067. However, the judges on the European Court of
Human Rights have recently demonstrated greater awareness of the tenuous nature
of the equation of secularism with neutrality. Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, 3
Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 60, 88 (2012) (concluding that the use of crosses on the walls of
public school classrooms in Italy is within the “margin of appreciation” in which deference to national traditions is warranted). See in particular the concurring opinion
of Judge Ann Power:
Neutrality requires a pluralist approach on the part of the State, not a secularist one. It encourages respect for all world views rather than a preference
for one. To my mind, the Chamber Judgment was striking in its failure to
recognise that secularism (which was the applicant’s preferred belief or
world view) was, in itself, one ideology among others. A preference for secularism over alternative world views—whether religious, philosophical[,] or
otherwise—is not a neutral option.
Id. at 98 (Power, J., concurring).
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are likely to be found only in small sects, huddled together to resist a
worldwide secular culture.”176 By century’s end, Berger told a different story. “[T]he assumption that we live in a secularized world is
false,” Berger declared:
The world today, with [the] exceptions [of Europe and of “an international subculture composed of people with Western-type higher
education”], is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some place
more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by
historians and social scientists loosely labeled “secularization theory” is essentially mistaken.177

Rather than abandoning the secularization hypothesis, other theorists narrow and refine the claim.178 The sort of secularization that
accompanies modernization, perhaps, is not a comprehensive secularism in which religion dwindles away altogether, but rather a more
institutional and political secularism in which religion, while continuing to flourish, retreats to the private sphere. This more modest version fits nicely with the paradigm of secular legitimacy, and with
modern American constitutional jurisprudence, which holds, once
again, that religion is free to flourish in private but that government is
supposed to be secular.
The problem is that just as empirical realities disconfirm the secularization hypothesis in its general “decline of religion” version, those
realities make trouble for the narrower, political version as well. That
is because in many parts of the world, including most obviously the
Islamic world but also the United States, religion has not accepted its
prescribed banishment from politics or its relegation to the private
domain. In a recent book called God’s Century, three political scientists argue that religion continues to be a powerful force in politics
worldwide and is likely to remain so in coming decades.179 Indeed,
both religion and religious influence on politics have actually become
stronger over the last several decades.180 In a similar vein, the Cana176 Peter Berger, A Bleak Outlook is Seen for Religion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1968, at 3.
177 Peter Berger, The Desecularization of the World: A Global Overview, in The Desecularization of the World 1, 2 (Peter L. Berger ed., 1999).
178 See, e.g., CASANOVA, supra note 163, at 6 (“I do not share the view that secularization was, or is, a myth. The core of the theory of secularization, the thesis of the
differentiation and emancipation of the secular spheres from religious institutions
and norms, remains valid.”). By now thinkers like Charles Taylor have developed a
variety of versions and accounts of secularization that do not embrace the older
“decline of religion” idea. See, for example, the essays in Rethinking Secularism,
supra note 2.
179 MONICA DUFFY TOFT ET AL., GOD’S CENTURY 1–2 (2011).
180 Id. With respect to religion itself, the authors explain that “[c]ontrary to . . .
predictions, the portion of the world population adhering to Catholic Christianity,
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dian political scientist Ran Hirschl reports that “approximately half of
the world’s population, perhaps more, now lives in polities where
religion not only has remained public but also has been playing a key
role in political and constitutional life.”181
The continuing presence of religion in politics deprives the secular paradigm of one of its more powerful appeals—namely, the claim
of irresistibility based on the assumption that the movement of history
is inexorably toward ever greater secularization. Proponents of the
secular paradigm understandably lament the loss of that claim.
Although their lamentations and predictions of imminent theocracy
can sometimes seem a bit overwrought,182 the lamenters correctly perceive that the powerful ongoing engagement of religion with politics
represents not merely an adverse political movement—adverse from a
secularist perspective—but a challenge to the fundamental paradigm
of legitimacy, which they have regarded as axiomatic.
Other versions of a secularization hypothesis may be more plausible. Charles Taylor argues, for example, for a more nuanced interpretation in which religion does not disappear, either in general or from
politics, but the basic character of religious belief changes.183 In past
centuries, Taylor contends, religious belief was virtually universal and
culturally mandatory. Today, by contrast, even where religion persists
it is one option among many. And a belief that is understood to be
both optional and embattled184 is not the same sort of self-confident
thing as a belief that is taken as axiomatic.185

Protestant Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism jumped from 50 percent in 1900 to 64
percent in 2000.” Id. at 2. Moreover, “a dramatic and worldwide increase in the
political influence of religion has occurred in roughly the past forty years.” Id. at 9
(emphasis deleted).
181 HIRSCHL, supra note 147, at 47.
182 See, e.g., KEVIN PHILLIPS, AMERICAN THEOCRACY xiii—xiv (2006). (analyzing
“strong theocratic pressures [that] are already visible in the Republican national coalitions and its leadership, while the substantial portion of Christian America committed
to theories of Armageddon and the inerrancy of the Bible has already made the GOP
into America’s first religious party”). Ronald Dworkin reports—it is not quite clear
whether he shares the horror—that “[m]any Americans are horrified by the prospect
of a new dark age imposed by militant superstition; they fear a black, know-nothing
night of ignorance in which America becomes an intellectually backward and stagnant theocracy.” RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE? 79 (2006).
183 See, generally, e.g., TAYLOR, supra note 117, at 539.
184 See, e.g., id. (“[I]t [is] so hard to believe in God in (many milieux of) the modern West, while in 1500 it was virtually impossible not to[.]”).
185 This thesis runs through Taylor’s lengthy book. See id.
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Taylor’s interpretation of secular modernity has been challenged,186 but for present purposes the important point is that even if
his description of our situation is correct, it provides frail support at
best for the secular paradigm of political legitimacy. If religious premises (including premises relevant to politics and government) are
optional today—not generally shared and hence in that sense “sectarian”—then exclusively secular premises are optional and “sectarian”
as well. Hence, the arguments that have typically been directed
against religion in politics—that religion is partisan and hence
polarizing and incapable of commanding general consent—may be
plausible, but they apply equally to the claim that government must be
confined to the secular. The so-called “culture wars” provide ample
evidence of such polarization in the United States.187
This observation points us to the problem with the other major
strategy that has supported the secular paradigm.
2. The Failure of the Neutrality Strategy.
Although courts and theorists have supposed that government
can be neutral toward religion by remaining secular, the increasingly
obvious fact is that governmental secularity is not a loftily neutral position floating above the fray of religious and anti-religious views; rather
such neutrality is itself one competing position among others. The
pretensions of neutrality depend on the assumption that religion just
is, inherently, a private phenomenon. In reality, though, a good deal
of religion has a public dimension and public implications. Moreover, this sort of public-oriented religion is not just the property of a
few marginal characters—so-called Christian Reconstructionists,188 for
example. In the United States, religion with a public dimension
includes the faiths of millions of citizens, past and present, including
luminaries such as Washington, Jefferson, and Lincoln.189 A secular
“neutrality” that would push the religion of these millions out of the
public sphere is decidedly not neutral toward religion in any meaningful sense.190
186

See, e.g., José Casanova, A Secular Age: Dawn or Twilight?, in VARIETIES OF SECUSECULAR AGE 265, 280–81 (Michael Warner, et al., eds., 2010).
187 See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER & ALAN WOLFE, IS THERE A CULTURE WAR? 1–9
(2006); JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA
70–72 (1991).
188 See, e.g., ROUSAS JOHN RUSHDOONY, CHRISTIANITY AND THE STATE (1986).
189 See Smith, supra note 151, at 970–72, 979–81.
190 I have developed this point at much greater length in Smith, supra note
164and STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE 77–97 (1995).
LARISM IN A
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Moreover, the expansion of the public sphere makes claims of
religious neutrality all the more obviously untenable. A society that
sponsored no public schools, or that supported schools devoted to a
narrow curriculum of basic skills and vocational training, might avoid
many conflicts with religion.191 As the schools’ agenda becomes more
ambitious, conversely, conflicts inevitably proliferate. The seemingly
perennial controversy over evolution illustrates the problem. In Epperson v. Arkansas, as noted, the Court struck down an Arkansas law,
adopted in the 1920s, which prohibited the teaching of evolution in
the public schools.192 In Epperson the Court was more than normally
emphatic about the “absolute” obligation of neutrality.193 The Court
also said that Arkansas had adopted the law in order to insulate fundamentalist faiths against contrary views; this ascribed motivation made
the law less than neutral toward religion, and hence constitutionally
invalid.194 But on the Court’s own premises—namely, that evolution
directly contradicts the teachings of some religions and that the Constitution imposes an “absolute” prohibition against a school curriculum that “‘aid[s] or oppose[s]’ any religion”—it follows with at least
equal logical force that the teaching of evolution in the public schools
opposes some forms of religion, and hence violates neutrality, and
hence is constitutionally prohibited.195
The commitment to neutrality is nonetheless deeply entrenched
and probably indispensable to the maintenance of the secular paradigm, at least in its amalgamated form,196 and so judicial and academic defenders rally to its support. The effort has led to increasingly
191 Many, but not all. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235–36 (1972).
192 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 109 (1968).
193 “Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters
of religious theory, doctrine, and practice,” the Court solemnly intoned. Id. at
103–04. Consequently, “the State may not adopt programs or practices in its public
schools or colleges which ‘aid or oppose’ any religion. This prohibition is absolute.” Id.
at 106 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
194 Id. at 107–09.
195 Id. at 106. Justice Black made the point in his concurring opinion. See id. at
113 (“If the theory [of evolution] is considered anti-religious, as the Court indicates,
how can the State be bound by the Federal Constitution to permit its teachers to
advocate such an ‘anti-religious’ doctrine to schoolchildren?”). I say with at least
equal logical force because in fact the Court’s own conclusion requires an additional
premise, namely, that the Constitution prohibits laws or measures that might not
themselves “aid or oppose” religion but that are motivated by a purpose of aiding or
opposing religion––that might be contestable, and that the counterargument does
not require.
196 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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complex and sophisticated elaborations and defenses of neutrality.197
These more sophisticated versions have been criticized at length elsewhere,198 and it would be too circuitous to plunge into the full debate
here. For now, an overall observation may suffice: “neutrality” is a
term that can be (and has been) used in a variety of ways, and there
are no doubt versions and usages under which a government that
remains steadfastly secular can be said to be “neutral” toward religion.
Unfortunately, when “neutrality” is defined in these more refined
senses, a position of neutrality no longer answers to the purposes
which made neutrality (including “secular neutrality”) attractive in
the first place. In short, the kinds of neutrality that are possible are
not the kinds that can deliver what was promised.
One example may serve to illustrate the problem. In response to
the incontrovertible fact that many government policies and pronouncements run contrary to the religious beliefs of some citizens,199
some proponents of neutrality argue that the ideal requires only that
government avoid explicitly indicating disapproval of any religious
belief or position. Government can speak and act in ways that implicitly indicate judgments about some people’s religious beliefs so long as
those judgments are not overtly stated.200 Andrew Koppelman, a leading proponent of neutrality and of this particular construction, insists
that it is necessary to limit the neutrality requirement to explicit pronouncements because a more expansive requirement would demand
the impossible; that is because “any time the state does anything, it is
implicitly endorsing some religious claims and rejecting others.”201
197 For one ambitious effort in this vein, see ANDREW KOPPELMAN, DEFENDING
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY (2013).
198 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 164, at 1.
199 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Five Questions about Religion Judges Are Afraid to Ask, in
OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH 196, 199 (Nancy L. Rosenblum
ed., 2000).
A court orders a state to desegregate its schools, the country goes to war,
educational funds are made available equally to men and women. The government has implicitly rejected religious notions that (1) God wishes rigid
racial separation, (2) all killing in war violates God’s commandments, (3) all
women should occupy themselves with domestic tasks. A vast array of laws
and policies similarly imply the incorrectness of particular religious views.
Id.
200 See, e.g., FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 185–95
(1995); Andrew Koppelman, The Troublesome Religious Roots of Religious Neutrality, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 865, 885 (2009); Steven H. Shiffrin, Liberalism and the Establishment Clause, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 717, 726–27 (2003);
201 Koppelman, supra note 200, at 885.
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He illustrates the point by observing that even a murder law implicitly
rejects Aztec religious beliefs favoring human sacrifice.202
Koppelman is right that in a nation of over three hundred million diversely minded citizens, it is a fair bet that almost anything government does will be at odds with the religious beliefs of at least a few
citizens. When government wages war, it at least tacitly rejects the
views of religious pacifists, such as Quakers, who believe that war is
always wrong. Laws requiring parents to obtain medical treatment for
their children reject the beliefs of parents—Christian Scientists and
others—who are religiously opposed to such treatment. But these
observations merely show that meaningful religious neutrality is
impossible, and that governmental secularity does not come close to
achieving such neutrality. And the introduction of a distinction
between explicit and implicit pronouncements on religion does little
to address the substantive difficulty.
For one thing, the implicit/explicit distinction is an elusive
203
one.
Suppose a biology teacher in a public school declares, “All of
the scientific evidence indicates that life evolved over millions of
years.” Is this an “explicit” or “implicit” rejection of the belief (held, it
seems, by thousands or even millions of Americans204) that the world
was created by God more recently and in a much shorter period? And
why should it matter anyway? If government says or does things that
clearly reject some people’s religious beliefs, and that are perceived as
doing so, why should it matter whether the rejection is “explicit” or
“implicit”? Either way, the judgment of rejection is both real and
understood,205 and the same problems of divisiveness, inequality, and
202 Id.
203 For criticism of the distinction, see Steven D. Smith, Barnette’s Big Blunder, 78
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 645–47 (2003).
204 See PUTNAM & CAMPBELL, supra note 148, at 21–22.
205 Indeed, Koppelman himself elsewhere recognizes and even insists on the
point; he contends that laws based on religious beliefs violate the Constitution by
implicitly endorsing religion and thereby violating neutrality. See Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 110–12 (2002).
The axiom that government may not declare religious truth entails restrictions on government conduct. It is a familiar point in free speech law that
conduct which is not itself speech may nonetheless communicate a message
and so be appropriately treated as speech. This means that the Establishment Clause’s restriction on government speech is also a restriction on symbolic conduct. If government cannot declare religious truth, then it cannot
engage in conduct the meaning of which is a declaration of religious
truth . . . .
Suppose a statute is passed that makes it a crime for anyone to break the
commandment to obey the Sabbath, as that commandment is understood by
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alienation are presented (as the ongoing struggles over the teaching
of evolution in American schools attest).
In sum, it is possible to define neutrality down so as to make it
attainable. But the attainable neutrality does not do what neutrality
was supposed to do or avoid the problems that neutrality was supposed to avoid.
In the past, and still, defenders of secular neutrality have often
tried to deal with these difficulties by marginalizing citizens who cannot be assimilated into the secular vision of government. We have
already seen how in Epperson the Supreme Court depicted religious
fundamentalists as ignorant and unthinking, much in the way H. L.
Mencken had done during the Scopes trial.206 In a similar vein, John
Rawls dismisses citizens unwilling to join his posited “overlapping consensus” as “unreasonable.”207 The effectiveness of these marginalizing
tactics may be parasitic on the secularization hypothesis, discussed earlier. Epperson was decided in the same year as Peter Berger’s forecast
that by the twenty-first century, religious believers would be “found
only in small sects, huddled together to resist a world-side secular culture.”208 For those confident in such forecasts, it might seem both
possible and appropriate to treat dissenters as a transitory annoyance,
worthy mainly of mockery. But subsequent developments have indicated that citizens who in one way or another reject the secular paradigm have declined to follow the script and exit the scene—either the
cultural scene or the political one. They refuse to acquiesce in
marginalization, and they evidently number in the millions (or perhaps, globally, in the billions209). The secular paradigm thus faces a
challenge that it has not managed to meet or deflect.

Orthodox Jews. That is, the law makes it a felony to operate machinery on
the Sabbath, to drive a car, to turn on an electric appliance, or to make a
telephone call, and the law applies to private as well as public conduct, so
that one can violate it by turning on the television while one is alone at
home. There is no substantive constitutional right to do any of these things.
The problem with this law lies in the message it contains: It implicitly asserts
the correctness of the commandment to keep the Sabbath holy and of the
Orthodox rabbis’ interpretation of that sentence. It declares religious truth.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
206 See supra notes 165–172 and accompanying text. For a more recent instance of
such mockery in a Supreme Court majority opinion, see McCreary County v. ACLU,
545 U.S. 844, 872–73 (2005). For a discussion, see Smith, supra note 151, at 1014–15.
207 See RAWLS, supra note 31; infra notes 213, 216, 219.
208 See Berger, supra note 177.
209 See supra notes 175–176 and accompanying text.
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D. Condition of Crisis
At present, therefore, the secular paradigm would seem to be in
serious distress. Our situation is similar to the kind of “crisis”
described by Kuhn,210 in which leading authorities come to the
defense of an embattled paradigm and yet are unable to defeat challenges or successfully to conceal the increasingly conspicuous anomalies and incongruities.
A political theory like that of John Rawls211 can be understood as
this sort of impressively sophisticated but ultimately unavailing exercise in the defense of a floundering paradigm. In Rawls’s vision of
political liberalism, responsible citizens and officials would bracket
their “comprehensive doctrines” (including, most obviously, their
religious faiths) for purposes of deliberating about and deciding the
most important public issues, and would confine themselves to the
kind of “public reason”212 that works from and within a supposed
“overlapping consensus.”213 But the increasingly stark fact is that this
ostensible “consensus” excludes millions of Americans214—globally,
the exclusion would be much more sweeping215—and Rawls’s effort to
mitigate the exclusion by pronouncing these citizens and their views
“unreasonable” began to look simply arbitrary and even authoritarian.216 To be sure, Rawls attempted over time to reduce the exclusionary character of his position by tweaking its constraints—he
introduced the “wide view” of public reason and the so-called “proviso”217—but these adjustments were more cosmetic than substantial.
210 See KUHN, supra note 19, at 66–76; supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
211 RAWLS, supra note 31, at 243 n.32.
212 See id. at 212–54.
213 The contemplated “overlapping consensus” would reflect agreement not about
“comprehensive doctrines” but, on the contrary, about a “political conception of justice” which is not dependent on any particular comprehensive doctrine. Id. at 39.
214 See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
215 See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
216 In a much noted footnote, for example, Rawls pronounced “to that extent
unreasonable” any doctrine (and presumably any person embracing such a doctrine)
that would restrict abortion beyond approximately the trimester framework of Roe v.
Wade. RAWLS, supra note 31, at 243 n.32. Millions of Americans were thereby
marginalized in an (admittedly long) peremptory footnote. For some backtracking,
see id. at lv n.31.
217 Originally, Rawls debated whether political liberalism supported the “exclusive
view” of public reason, which would categorically exclude invocation of comprehensive doctrines, or the “inclusive view,” which would “allow[ ] citizens, in certain situations, to present what they regard as the basis of political values rooted in their
comprehensive doctrine, provided they do this in ways that strengthen the ideal of public
reason itself.” Id. at 247 (emphasis added). He concluded that the proper view could
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Although its precise meaning is less than clear, for example, the implication of Rawls’s “proviso” seems to be that religious citizens are free
to participate in public debate, and to assert their religious beliefs, so
long as outcomes can nonetheless be justified without reference to
these religious contributions. But this amounts to saying that religious citizens can participate in public decision-making so long as their
religious contribution makes no difference to outcomes.
Only a sympathizer determined to stick with Rawls’s position
through thick and thin could find this sort of illusory accommodation
an adequate answer to the problem of exclusion. Imagine a similar
solution to earlier battles over racial discrimination in voting: racial
minorities will be permitted to vote, “provided that in due course
[non-minority votes are cast] sufficient to support whatever [outcome
racial minorities may have favored].”218
The fact is that although Rawls’s position might fit comfortably
enough in a largely secularized culture—and it may be that this is
indeed the sort of subculture that liberal theorists inhabit219—it will
continue to seem alien and hostile to many ordinary citizens. Noah
Feldman observes that “constitutional decisions marginalizing or banning religion from public places have managed to alienate millions of
people who are also sincerely committed to an inclusive American
project.”220 In a similar vein, Peter Berger explains:
A purely secular view of reality has its principal social location in an
elite culture that, not surprisingly, is resented by large numbers of
vary with historical and social circumstances. Id. at 247–54, while acknowledging (in
what critics may take as a wry understatement) that “much more would have to be said
to make this suggestion at all convincing . . . .” Id. at 251. Later, Rawls explicitly
revised this position to adopt what he called the “wide view” elaborated by “the proviso,” which held that “[comprehensive] doctrines may be introduced in public reason at any time, provided that in due course public reasons, given by a reasonable
political conception, are presented sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive
doctrines are introduced to support.” Id. at li–lii.
218 John Horton, Rawls, Public Reason and the Limits of Liberal Justification 1, 12
(Political Studies Association-UK 50th Annual Conference 2000), available at http://
www.psa.ac.uk/cps/2000/Horton%20John.pdf.
219 Commenting on the spectacle of “[l]iberal ideologues, who celebrate tolerance and pluralism while at the same time condemning any meaningful dissent from
their own thin idea of the good as not merely wrong but contrary to the dictates of
reason itself,” Paul Campos speculates that Rawlsian claims about “reasonable[ness]”
and the “overlapping consensus” can enjoy plausibility only among a select group of
academicians whose world is effectively limited to those who “work at the same institutions, attend the same conferences, read the same newspapers, live in the same suburbs, and send their children to the same schools . . . .” Paul F. Campos, Secular
Fundamentalism, in AGAINST THE LAW 181, 200–02 (Paul F. Campos et al. eds., 1996).
220 NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 15 (2005).
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people who are not part of it but who feel its influence (most troublingly, as their children are subjected to an education that ignores
or even directly attacks their own beliefs and values).221

Berger’s description fits almost exactly with Arnold Toynbee’s
account of a society in the phase of “breakdown.” What was once a
“creative minority” has lost its power to elicit the free and genuine
respect of many in the broader society, and has thus become a “dominant minority” that rules largely by virtue of position and power. In
opposition to this dominant minority stands an “internal proletariat”
that exhibits “a consciousness—and the resentment that this consciousness inspires—of being disinherited from [their] ancestral place
in society.”222
In the United States, evidence of such consciousness is on daily
display in the so-called “culture wars.”223 On a more global scale, Ran
Hirschl describes a similar phenomenon:
In terms of demographic indicators, support for religious parties in
these countries [including Israel, Malaysia, Turkey, and Egypt] is
often closely associated with the relative have-nots and is distinctly
more prevalent among occupiers of the sidelines, economic and
cultural. Secularism and cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, are
often associated with the metaphorical center. It often comprises
old elites, the urban intelligentsia, and the managerial class and is
characteristic of the relative haves, members of the upper socioeconomic echelons.224

In this Essay, of course, we have been considering not society or
societies in general, but rather only one aspect of a society—namely,
the pertinent background beliefs that make up a society’s “paradigm
of legitimacy.” But insofar as the paradigm of legitimacy in America
and various other democratic societies has been a secular one,
Toynbee’s description fits: the secular paradigm is in a condition of
breakdown, and seems currently to be a source of “schism in the body
social.”225

221 Berger, supra note 177, at 11.
222 5 ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE, A STUDY OF HISTORY 63 (D.C. Somervell abr. 1946).
223 Cf. 1 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 423 (2010) (describing the escalating series of provocations and legal claims from both sides of the “culture wars”).
224 HIRSCHL, supra note 147, at 11; see also Bhargava, supra note 8, at 100
(“[E]xclusion from the larger public sphere forces the religious to form their own
narrow public where resentment and prejudice will flourish.”).
225 RECONSIDERATIONS, supra note 45, at 48–243.
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CONCLUSION: WHITHER?

So, what may we look forward to? Caveats are immediately in
order. First, as Toynbee himself insisted, prediction is always hazardous and speculative. Second, in Toynbee’s scheme, “breakdown” was
not the final phase of a society; it was a prelude to what he called
“disintegration,” and the overall process could take centuries.226
Moreover, Toynbee emphasized that these developments are not
deterministic in nature;227 so it was not inevitable that the failures and
fragmentation that constitute breakdown would necessarily culminate
in disintegration.228 Kuhn likewise maintained that a paradigm can
sometimes enter a condition of crisis but then recover; he also
believed that even an embattled paradigm is likely to persist until
some more satisfactory alternative develops.229
So on these understandings it would seem that prospects for what
might result from the current crisis of the secular paradigm would
turn on whether adequate responses to the challenges can be devised
and, even if they cannot be, on whether better alternative paradigms
emerge.230 There is little point in speculating here about those eventualities.231 But one prominent and less radical possibility has already
been obliquely suggested and might be noticed more directly.
Earlier we noted a possible important distinction—though one
that tends to pass overlooked in much theorizing and jurisprudence
today—between a secular paradigm of legitimacy and a paradigm of secular
legitimacy. As we saw, the latter kind of paradigm—or the idea that in
226 Cf. Sorokin, supra note 45, at 183 (“[S]ome of [Toynbee’s] civilizations which,
according to his scheme, ought to have been dead a long time ago, after their breakdown, lived centuries, even thousands of years, and are still alive and very much so.”).
227 RECONSIDERATIONS, supra note 45, at 518 (“Patterns in the course of human
affairs are not predetermined or inevitable, and that therefore past patterns afford no
basis for predictions about the future.”).
228 A STUDY OF HISTORY, supra note 222, at 254, 403; see also, RECONSIDERATIONS,
supra note 45, at 534 (“Western Civilization may or may not be in decline in our time;
contemporary Westerners are not in a position to diagnose their own civilization’s
prospects.”).
229 See supra notes 34–43 and accompanying text.
230 While acknowledging that the secularism is in a state of crisis, Rajeev Bhargava
argues that “we still do not possess a reasonable, moral, and ethical alternative to
secularism. Secularism remains our best bet to help us deal with ever-deepening religious diversity . . . .” Bhargava, supra note 8, at 92. Bhargava accordingly proposes that
secularism be “rehabilitated” by relaxing the commitments of Western versions of secularism in favor of practices and understandings from other countries such as India.
Id.
231 Cf. Casanova, supra note 186, at 281 (“But it is futile to try to prophesy the
possible forms and contents of such postsecular social imaginaries.”).
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order to be legitimate governments must confine themselves to the
secular—seems to be a more recent development. Moreover, it is that
more recent construal of the secular paradigm that is the primary
source and locus of the difficulties considered in this Essay. In the
United States, religious citizens often object to the idea that their
religious beliefs must be excluded from political deliberations,232 or
that government cannot affirm religious ideas such as the Ten Commandments233 or the words “one nation under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance.234 They may resent the elimination of prayers from high
school graduation ceremonies.235 Conversely, except with respect to
the claim that governments and politics should be purely secular,
there seems to be little opposition to the more affirmative ideas that
constitute what we have called the modern “secular paradigm of legitimacy”—democracy, the rule of law, and individual rights. Thus, religious citizens in the United States today typically do not oppose the
democratic idea that government should be based on the consent of
the governed.236 Indeed, they may resent judicial impositions of secularism on the public sphere in part precisely because such impositions
can seem authoritarian, undemocratic, and contrary to the consent of
the governed.237
Basic assumptions about law and government may of course be
different in, say, the Islamic world. Even so, speaking from an evi232 Cf. Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments Should Be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639, 656 (1999)
(“The principle of secular rationale degrades religious persons from the status as of
equal citizens.”).
233 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Nine Justices and Ten Commandments, N.Y. TIMES,
August 26, 2010, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/26/nine-justicesand-ten-commandments/?ref=opinion&nl=opinion&emc=tya1 (lamenting that after a
2005 Supreme Court decision forbidding a Ten Commandments display in Kentucky
courthouses, efforts to erect such displays in public buildings around the country
have “gone viral”).
234 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (reversing a
much criticized Ninth Circuit decision declaring the words constitutionally invalid in
public school exercises).
235 See, e.g., ROBERT S. ALLEY, WITHOUT A PRAYER 140–43 (1996).
236 While challenging this consensus, Robert Kraynak acknowledges that “[a]lmost
all churches and theologians now believe that the form of government most compatible with the Christian religion is democracy. . . . For Christians in the contemporary
world, it seems obvious that the Gospel message of care for the poor and universal
love requires democratic equality and freedom in one fashion or another.” ROBERT P.
KRAYNAK, CHRISTIAN FAITH AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 1 (2001).
237 See, for example, the various essays and opinions collected in END OF DEMOCRACY? (Richard John Neuhaus ed., 1997).
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dently secular perspective and to “secularists under duress”238 in some
areas of the globe, Ran Hirschl proposes the relinquishment of secularist commitments together with vigorous affirmation of a different
feature typical of modern notions of legitimacy—namely, constitutionalism. Hirschl argues that along with the increasing involvement of
religion in politics through much of the world a commitment to constitutionalism has grown as well, and these two developments can complement and check each other. “Just as in constitutional democracy
the ‘constitutional’ keeps in check the ‘democracy’ aspect, so does the
‘constitutional’ in constitutional theocracy limit the spread of theocratic governance in settings prone to such expansion.”239 Constitutionalism need not be secular; on the contrary, a variety of relations to
religion is compatible with constitutional government.240 Secularists
would naturally prefer that government be secular, of course, but in
many contexts that possibility may be unavailable. “As support for theocratic governance continues to grow [in some parts of the world],
religious establishment becomes an increasingly attractive, lesser-evil
solution for secularists, statists, modernists, and other religion-taming
interests . . . .”241
One possibility, in short, is that it will turn out upon reconsideration that governmental secularism is not as essential to the paradigm
of legitimacy that has developed since the Reformation and Enlightenment as many jurists and theorists have supposed. Although ideas
of popular sovereignty and constitutionalism are in themselves secular,
not theological, they need not mandate that governments must be
secular.
In sum, it may be that what is in a state of “crisis” and “breakdown” is not so much the secular paradigm of legitimacy, exactly, but
instead an unnecessary imposition upon, or extension of, that paradigm—namely, the paradigm of secular legitimacy. Theorists have
already begun seriously to rethink the connection between religion
and democracy in contemplating prospects for democracy in countries like Iraq.242 The connection might be reconsidered as well for
places like . . . America.

238 HIRSCHL, supra note 147, at 50.
239 Id. at 13.
240 Id. at 26–40.
241 Id. at 19.
242 See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD (2003) (discussing whether democracy
can flourish today in lands where Islam prevails).
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